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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
On the evening of June 25, 1944, a group of
about 60

women gathered in the safety of Guatemala City's
San

Francisco church.

1

At 6:00 p.m., the women, dressed in

black to mourn the death of constitutional rule, began

marching silently down Fifth Avenue two by two saying the
rosary and holding candles.

A few blocks away a cavalry

unit awaited them with orders from Guatemala's dictator

Jorge Ubico to disperse the gathering by whatever means
necessary.

As the procession passed the corner of

Seventeenth Street and Fifth Avenue, both the cavalry and
army units fired a volley of shots into the crowd.

When the

firing stopped, Maria Chinchilla, a school teacher from

Guatemala City and a woman later identified as Seriora
Aresti, lay dead in the street.

Twenty others were wounded

as the bullets ripped through the crowd. 2

Christine Anne Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico: A Case
of Non-Violent Action in Guatemala" (B.A. Thesis, Friends World
College,

1976)

,

89.

2

U.S. Department of State, Records of the Department of
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Guatemala, 1930-1944
814.00/7-2444, FBI report "Guatemala: Possible Revolution", July
All citations for Diplomatic correspondence come from
24, 1944.
the Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Guatemala. 1930-1944 and they will be cited
throughout this thesis as DOS with a decimal reference number,
title, date, and page number where applicable.
,

,

1

With this event the Guatemalan Revolution
began.
martyrdom of Maria Chinchilla and Aresti galvanized

The

the

opposition overnight behind the demand for Ubico's
resignation. What had been muted requests for the

restoration of constitutional guarantees became

a

call for an end to his archaic and brutal regime.

unified
The U.S.

ambassador, Boaz Long, accurately predicted the political

repercussions of Ubico's action: "I greatly fear this

unfortunate incident may further incite the populace." 3
Within five days massive popular pressure forced Ubico to
resign, and within a year Guatemala had a new constitution,
a

popularly elected president, and a reformist Congress.

The collapse of Ubico's regime ushered in a period of reform

which changed Guatemala forever.
The revolutionaries who drove Ubico from power replaced
an outmoded authoritarian dictatorship with a vibrant,

reformist democracy. They exchanged nineteenth century

caudillismo for a more inclusive political system based on
the principles of economic and social justice.

With the

reforms they implemented, the dictator's opponents

dismantled the old power structure and introduced modern
economic, political and social institutions which enabled

3

DOS 814.00/9-2944, Boaz Long to Hull, June 25,
2

1944

them to address their nation's underdevelopment
and

renegotiate its dependency.
The Revolution also formed part of

a

much broader

populist movement which swept all of Latin America from the
193 0s onward.

These movements emerged as a response to the

socio-economic crisis brought on by the Great Depression.
They addressed the problems of elite political dominance and

economic under-development which they perceived as the root
of the crisis.

The populist movements which coalesced in

this period were predominantly urban, reformist, multi-class
alliances, which drew support from the middle and working

classes and relied on a charismatic leader to hold the

coalition together. 4

It is difficult, however, to

generalize about the nature of the reforms carried out
by populist regimes because of the diversity of approaches

these governments employed to address their social and

economic problems.

A list of populist leaders would include

such important figures as Getulio Vargas, Juan Domingo
Peron,

Lazaro Cardenas, and Victor Haya de la Torre.

The

Guatemalan Presidents Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo and Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman belong in that list as well.

This definition is based on the definition offered by
Michael Conniff in his article "Toward a Comparative Definition
Latin American P opulism in
of Populism" in Michael Conniff, ed.
Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982).
,

3

Jorge Ubico's fall marked the end of Guatemala's
Liberal oligarchic era and the establishment of

a new

populist order. By exploring the events between the

overthrow of Ubico and the inauguration of Arevalo

I

will

explain the emergence of the populist political coalition

which ruled Guatemala from 1944 to 1954.

This focus

highlights the origins of the dramatic changes which shook
the nation during the following "Ten Years of Spring."

The

revolutionaries eventually enacted landmark labor laws, set
up a social security system, encouraged unionization,

carried out land reform, and restructured the economic
system.

Those measures changed Guatemala's political and

economic landscape forever.
regained absolute power.

The oligarchy has never

Since 1944 they have had to share

power with a politicized middle class and an increasingly

independent military.
The Revolution also had it limits, and those limits
tell a great deal about the nature of the political forces

which combined to change the face of Guatemala's political
life. Specifically, the revolutionaries, while instituting

broad and sweeping reforms also reproduced a system based on
class and ethnic division.

While they pushed for inclusion

in the political system, the revolutionaries did not

4

aggressively push for a complete reordering of the
political
system.

This proved an important legacy of the Revolution.

The key to all of these crucial changes lies in the
initial ten months of the Revolution.

Many historians have

studied the decade from 1944 to 1954, but none have focused
on this pivotal period from June of 1944 to March of 1945. 5

Between Ubico's fall and Arevalo's induction into office,
the revolutionaries defined the basic tenets of their

movement, enacted numerous structural reforms, and set up a

constitutional system.

Examining the nature of this

transitional period emphasizes some important aspects of the
decade of reform known as the "Ten Years of Spring."

First,

it places the Guatemalan Revolution in the context of a

broader process of readjustment and reform which took place
in Latin America after the Depression.

Second,

it expands

our understanding of a key achievement of the Revolution,
the expansion of political participation.

Third, it

explicitly focuses on the role of the middle-class and
clarifies the origin of that class and the populist politics
they implemented.

And finally, by employing this approach

I

hope to expand historians' understanding of populism as a

use the phrase the Revolution to
describe the ten year period from 1944 to 1954. When speaking of
the specific uprisings of 1944 I refer to them as the June
Revolution and the October Revolution.

throughout this thesis

I

5

whole. By combining a synthesis of the secondary
literature
on the Revolution with new insights drawn
from newspaper

accounts, Guatemalan Government documents, and U.S.

Department of State sources,

will demonstrate that the

I

revolutionaries and their vision of a new order were firmly
within the mainstream of Latin American populism.
Placing the Revolution within the framework of populism
helps clarify that Guatemala's political upheaval in the
late 1940s was part and parcel of a much broader process

which effected all of Latin America.

Emphasizing this helps

facilitate a comparative analysis of the various populist

experiments in Latin America, and reveals the similarities
and discontinuities in the political history of the nations
of Iberoamerica.

Applying the populist label to Guatemala

helps us understand the local process of change and the more

global political trends which it was part of.

This thesis consists of five sections. The first

section discusses the historiography of both the Revolution
and populism. The second explains the context within which

the uprising against Ubico occurred and charts the emergence
of the middle class and the factors which led to the advent
of populism as a political force in the country.

The next

section provides an interpretive narrative of the events
from June,

1944 to March,

1945 in an effort to reveal the

6

populist character of the Revolution.

This section is the

heart of the thesis, and focuses on the construction
of a
new political system by concentrating on the
drafting of the

Constitution of 1945.

This focus is justified because the

reforms embodied in the constitution provided the foundation
for all reforms that followed.

In the final section

some concluding remarks and discuss the legacy of the

Revolution.

7

I

offer

;

.

CHAPTER

;

2

THE LITERATURE

While a comprehensive history of the Guatemalan
Revolution remains to be written, there is an extensive
literature on many different aspects of the revolutionary
process.

These works can be broken down into broad

chronological categories for the purpose of summarizing the

historiography of the period. The first category is made up
of contemporary accounts or works that were written during

the "Ten Years of Spring" by observers of the Revolution. 6

The second group is made up of the works which revolution-

aries and their critics wrote immediately after the

overthrow of the Arbenz regime in 1954.

These books are

largely the product of the Cold War and they debate the
nature and extent of Communist influence in Guatemala in
this period. 7

The final category consists of the more

The most interesting works in this category are: Kalman
Silvert, A Study in Government Guatemala (New Orleans, 1954)
Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla, El dictador v vo (Guatemala, 1950)
Jose Garcia Bauer, Nuestra Revolucion Leaislativa (Guatemala,
Samuel Guy Inman, A New day in Guatemala, a St udy of the
1948)
Present Social Revolution (Wilton, Conn, 1951)
:

;

The works in this category are packed with interesting
Some of the best pro-revolutionary works are:
insights.
Guillermo Toriello, La batalla de Guatemala (Mexico, 1955) Juan
Jose Arevalo, La democracia y el imperio (Santiago, 1954) Luis
and
La revolucion auatemalteca (Mexico, 1955)
Cardoza y Aragon,
Manuel Galich, Por que lucha Guatemala, Arevalo v Arbenz: Do s
hombres contra un imperio (Buenos Aires, 1956). On the side of
7

;

;

;

8

;

.

recent academic analyses of the Revolution.

.

Naturally,

these are the most useful and germane for this
analysis. 8

A review of the broad range of works on the Guatemalan

Revolution lends support to the argument that this was a
populist movement.

Even though very few of the works

explicitly describe it as populist, they all stress the
middle class, reformist nature of the movement.

Jim Handy,

Kalman Silvert, Mario Monteforte Toledo, Edelberto TorresRivas, Thomas Leonard, and Kenneth Greib, the most important

contributors to the historiography of the Revolution, agree
on its basically bourgeois-democratic character.

According

to this argument the revolutionaries sought to establish

democracy, modernize the economy, expand political

participation, and break the power of the old oligarchy.

The clearest exposition of this interpretation, and the
intellectual inspiration for the analysis presented here,

the critics the most effective works were published in English
and are:
James Daniel, Red Design in the Americas: Guatemalan
Prelude (New York, 1954) U.S. Department of State, Intervention
of International Communism (Washington, D.C., 1954); and Ronald
Schneider, Communism in Guatemala. 1944-1954 (New York, 1958)
;

The most important works in this category are; Tomas
Herrera, Guatemala: Revolucion de Octubre (San Jose, 1986)
Thomas Leonard, The United States and Central America. 1944-1949
(university, Al., 1984); Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History
Mario Monteforte Toledo, La
of Guatemala (Boston, 1984)
and Richard Immerman,
revolucion de Guatemala (Guatemala, 1975)
The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin,
;

.

1982)
9

;

.

can be found in the work of Edelberto Torres-Rivas. 9

He

highlights the "nationalist reformist" nature of the

Revolution and argues that it initiated

a

decade of

important transformations in Guatemalan society.

Torres-

Rivas is correct in noting that the middle class did not
simply reject the authoritarian rule of Jorge Ubico when
they seized power in October of 1944; they also sought to

modernize Guatemala.

He interprets the Revolution as the

demise of the old oligarchic system based on the power of
the seignorial elite and its replacement by a new system

that would deliver freedom and prosperity to sectors of

society previously denied such benefits of progress.

Torres-Rivas concludes, and this is the underlying

assumption of the analysis presented here, that these
changes only ushered in a new stage of dependent
development.

The middle class forced their way into power.

The elite simply expanded the ruling caste to include the

elements of the middle class which could no longer be

9

His primary work is, Interpretacion del desarrollo social
centroamericano (San Jose, 1981), but the clearest and most
concise explanation of his interpretation of the Revolution is in
the essay "Guatemala: Medio siglo de historia politica (Un ensayo
de interpretacion sociologica) " in America Latina: histo ria de
medio siglo ed. by Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (Mexico, 1981)
Another very provocative work which places the Guatemalan
Revolution in a more global context is Torres-Rivas',
"Centroamerica: algunos rasgos de la sociedad de Postguerra",
Kellogg Institute Working Paper #25 (Notre Dame, IN, 1984).
.

10

ignored. The power of the old oligarchy
had been modified,
but not entirely broken. 10

Another key contributor to the literature is Mario
Monteforte Toledo, a Guatemalan sociologist who
participated
in the Revolution.
In his works, Guatemala. Monoarafia
Socioloqica and La revolu cion de Guatemala

,

Monteforte

Toledo analyzes the growth of the middle class and its

political ascendancy.

He follows Torres-Rivas very closely

when he writes that the 1920s and 1930s "opened the door to
a

new step in political life: the inclusion of both the

salaried and the independent petty bourgeoisie and the

working class, and the initiation of modern capitalism." 11
North Americans such as Jim Handy, Thomas Leonard, and

Richard Immerman document the conflicts of the revolutionary
decade without thoroughly analyzing the nature of the

coalition which dislodged Ubico and uprooted the Liberal

oligarchic order.

Like Torres-Rivas and Monteforte Toledo,

however, they employ terminology vaguely resembling populism
but do not specifically define it as populist.

Jim Handy, in his work Gift of the Devil

,

For example,

says that the

"character of the revolution was nationalist and democratic"

10

Torres-Rivas, Interpretacion del dessarrollo social
171-6.
centroamericano
,

11

Mario Monteforte Toledo, Centroamerica
17.
dependencia (Mexico, 1972), vol. 2
,

11

,

subdessarrollo v

.

with the establishment of

primary goal. 12

a

modern capitalist economy as its

Richard Immerman closely follows this

interpretation when he writes that the revolutionaries
sought the "organization of a modern capitalist system
and
the rearrangement and revitalization of the social

structure." 13

And Thomas Leonard also pursues this same

line of argumentation when he explains that the Revolution

"promised a new order in building Guatemala's resources

without foreign capital and a
man.

'

sguare deal

1

for the common

" 14

The common thread here is that the authors agree on the

general outlines of the Revolution without seeing it as part
of the broader populist transition which took place through-

out Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s.

Roland Ebel

(a

political scientist)

populist political movement. 15

,

Only one author,

explicitly calls this a

The others are content to

refer to the movement as "more or less populist" or

12

Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala

(Boston, 1984)

,

103.

13

Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, The Foreign Policy
38.
of Intervention (Austin, 1982
)

,

u Thomas Leonard, The United States and Central America,
1944-1949 (University, Al,1984), 84.
15

See Roland Ebel, "Populist Opposition to Populism: Middle
Class Opposition to The Arevalo and Arbenz Regimes in Guatemala"
Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political
Science Association (Spring 1988)
12

.

nationalist-democratic.

These labels do not adequately

describe the goals or achievements of the
Revolution.
They also obscure the fact that the Guatemalan
who rose up
against Ubico were very conscious of themselves as
part of a
broader Latin American effort to translate the
democratic
rhetoric of the war years into concrete political and
social
reforms for their nation.
In applying the populist label to Guatemala it is

important to stress that there is no single phenomenon
"populism."

Latin American populism is very different from

its counterparts in North America and Russia, and there are

many different types of populism within Latin America.

I

will limit my discussion of populism to the Latin American

variants

There are a number of historical leaders and movements
which scholars label "populist": Peron in Argentina, Vargas
in Brazil,

Cardenas in Mexico, Batlle y Ordonez in Uruguay,

Velasquez in Ecuador, Gaitan in Colombia, and Haya de la
Torre in Peru.

All these and many more are understood to be

part of some broader phenomenon called populism.

The

Guatemalan Revolution is contemporaneous with most of these
populist movements and it shares many of their attributes
such as;

middle class leadership, urban character,

a

modernizing reformist vision, demands for political reform,

13

and increased participation. Again, explicitly
viewing

Guatemala's experience as part of this broader
political
trend helps us understand the dynamics of change
which

drove

change both locally and throughout the continent.
It is important to note that in the 1930s and
1940s

populism would not have been a term applied by the
participants to their movements.

Populism is an abstract

idea which academic observers have applied to political

movements after the fact in order to explain the momentous
changes which swept much of Latin America and the world from
the 1930s to the 1960s. It is a propos here to briefly

explore the historiography of populism and to show how it
has been applied to Latin American political history.

According to Michael Conniff, the first writer to
conceptualize populism rigorously was the Argentine
sociologist Torcuato di Telia. 16

His paper, presented at a

1965 London conference, became the basic frame of reference
in debate about populist movements.

17

He defined populism

as a movement

16

Michael Conniff, "Toward a Comparative Definition of
Latin American Populism in
Populism" in Michael Conniff, ed.
24.
Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982)
,

,

17

See Torcuato di Telia, "Populismo y reforma en America
Latina ", Dessarrollo Economico 4 1965) 391-425 and "Ideologias
monoliticas en sistemas politicos plurupartidistats: el caso
latinoamericano" in Argentina, sociedad de masas ed. Gino
Germani (Buenos Aires, 1965), 272-84.
(

,

,

,

,

14

...which enjoys the support of the urban working
class and/or the peasantry but which does not
result from the autonomous organizational power of
either of these two sectors. It is supported by
non-working class sectors upholding an anti-status
quo ideology.

Though a very basic formulation, di Telia's definition hit
upon key elements of populism; mobilization of the masses by
the middle class, discontent with the status quo, and the

transformation of society by a multi-class coalition.
Social scientists (especially in Latin America) debated
and discussed populism throughout the 1960s and 1970s. From

this exchange blossomed a huge volume of scholarship so that
the concept took on a life of its own. The intellectual

interchange between the social sciences and history during
this period led to new ways of thinking about political
history, and in the late 1970s historians appropriated the
idea of populism and integrated it into their work.

Between 1977 and 1983 historians produced several
These works contributed

excellent books about populism.

substantially to our understanding of politics in post-War
Latin America revealing continental trends and

Quoted in Michael Conniff, "Toward a Comparative Definition
Latin American Populism in
of Populism" in Michael Conniff, ed.
24.
Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982)
18

,

,

,

15

.

commonalities. 19

.

Unfortunately, the analytical framework of

populism has not yet been vigorously applied to
the
experience of Central America as a whole or Guatemala
specifically. 20

Initial attempts have been made to apply

an analysis of populism to Guatemala, but they have
been

sketchy at best.
will show through an interpretive narrative of the

I

Revolution, that the movement which toppled the last of

Guatemala's Liberal dictator's was not merely liberal
democratic as has been claimed by most historians

,

but

rather was populist in the fullest sense of the word.

This

thesis will combine new sources on Guatemala in this period
with the systematic focus on populism applied so fruitfully
to other countries in Latin America.

By bringing these two

The key works in the historiography of populism appeared
from 1977 onwards. These works include: Christopher Mitchell, The
Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From MNR to Military Rule (New
York, 1977)
Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 19321952 (Urbana, 1978); Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en el
Ecuador: Analisis de los fundamentos socio-economicos del
1895-1934 (Quito, 1980)
Michael
surgimiento del Velasquismo
Conniff, Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925Richard Sharpless, Gaitan of Colombia: A
1945 (Pittsburgh, 1981)
and Steve Stein, Populism
Political Biography (Pittsburgh, 1978)
in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social
Control (Madison, 1980)
;

1

;

,

;

;

20

Only Costa Rican populism has been carefully studied in
the work of Charles Ameringer and J.P Bell. See Charles
Ameringer, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of Jose Figueres of
Costa Rica (Albuquerque, 1978) and J.P. Bell, Crisis in Costa
Rica: The 1948 Revolution (Austin, 1971)
16

strands together

I

hope to stimulate some new thinking about

this crucial transition in Guatemala's history,
while at the
same time attempting to expand our understanding
of

populism as a whole.

17

CHAPTER

3

THE ORIGINS OF POPULIST POLITICS

The growth of the Guatemalan middle class during
the

early twentieth century and its subseguent disaffection
with
the established order led to the development of a strong

populist movement which ousted the last of the Liberal

dictators in 1944.

This movement developed for

a

number of

reasons.

First, the growth of the middle class meant the

growth of

a

new political force capable of mobilizing

discontent. Second, economic crisis fostered

a

sense of

urgency among the middle class whereby they were forced to
make a choice between challenging the old oligarchy to

restructure the economy or resigning themselves to sinking
back into poverty.

Third, Ubico's repressive rule

heightened middle class resentment of the nation's archaic
political system. Fourth,

a

surge of nationalism fed by

a

growing awareness of the nation's dependency contributed to
the growth of populism, and that sentiment became

a

component of the opposition's ideology.

ideals of

Finally,

key

the Atlantic Charter and the political model of Latin

American populism provided powerful inspiration to

18

Guatemalans seeking the language and legitimacy
to transform
their nation.
The middle class constituted the most important

component of the political movement which drove
Jorge Ubico
from power in 1944. Very little, however, has been
written
on the emergence of the middle class as a political
force
despite its importance, and even less is known about the
factors which led to its development.

In most accounts the

Guatemalan bourgeoisie appears fully formed around 1920, as
if this social class materialized by spontaneous generation

or simply arrived to fulfill its historical mission of

transforming Guatemala into a "modern" democracy.
By 1944, the middle class made up approximately 17

percent of the population of Guatemala. 21

Sixty percent of

this group worked as administrators, teachers, government

workers and military officers. The remaining

40

percent

worked for themselves in business, medicine, law. 22

Their

origins, however, remain obscured by inadequte census

materials and a lack of careful historical research.
The crucial question is, however, where did they come
from?

21

Mario Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala: Monoarafia sociolocrica

(Mexico,
22

Working back from the 1940s when they made up almost

1959), 257.

Ibid.
19

20 percent of the population,

it is difficult to trace the

development of the middle class empirically.

The nucleus of

this class, however, almost certainly formed
during the

economic boom periods of the late nineteenth century.

It

most likely expanded as the agricultural export
sector

stimulated demand for goods and services.

In short, the

economic success of indigo, cochineal and coffee in the late

nineteenth century probably spurred the development of an
independent, national bourgeoisie. 23

The appearance of this

group can intuitively be linked directly to the processes of

economic growth, expansion of the State apparatus, and

urbanization in this period.
The expansion of the coffee economy during the booms of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created

new opportunities for the nascent middle class.

The nation

experienced a hundredfold increase in coffee production
between the 1870s and the early 1900s, and the economy grew
rapidly. 24

The progress of these years benefitted the

coffee oligarchy almost exclusively. But the boom seems to
have lead to the emergence of the middle class because the

23

250-257. See also Piero Gleijeses, "La aldea de
25Ubico: Guatemala, 1931-1944" in Mesoamerica 17 (June 1989)
Ibid.

,

:

59.
24

York,

Chester Lloyd Jones, Guatemala, Past and Present (New
1966),

210.'

20

.

elite needed doctors, lawyers, administrators,
and

government officials to keep the system running
smoothly.
Urban growth, fueled by the role of the cities as
commercial and distribution centers, also probably
furthered
the middle class' expansion, with an increasing
population
of city dwellers came the attendant demands for skilled

workers and services.

Native Americans who migrated to the

capital to fill the needs of the expanding agro-export

economy formed the bulk of the expanding middle class.

in

giving up their traditional dress, language and culture the

traditional Native Americans became ladinos (or hispanicized
Indians)

and

made a huge transition from the world of their

ancestors to the world of the urban metropolis.

Guatemala City's emergence as the administrative and

distribution center for export agriculture also spurred the
expansion of the middle class. The population of Guatemala
City and environs in 1893 stood at approximately 100,000,
and this number grew to around 200,000 by 1921. 25

270,000 people lived in the city by 1940. 26

Fully

Quetzaltenango,

"Ibid., 268.
26

This number is based on the 1950 census population for
Guatemala City which was 283,000. For 1950 numbers see
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The
Economic Development of Guatemala (Washington, 1951)
21
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Guatemala's second largest city mirrored the growth
of the
capital 27
The expansion of the state apparatus throughout
the
Liberal era proved a crucial impetus for stimulating the

development of the national bourgeoisie.

The rising number

of government positions provided jobs for an increasing

number of urban salaried workers as teachers, technocrats,
and civil servants.

This expansion of the state bureaucracy

intensified during the pre-Depression coffee export boom,
and many people moved into the solid middle class in this

period by landing a government job and gaining the economic
security which allowed to become "respectable" members of
society.

Urban growth, economic booms, and the expansion of the
state provided the necessary conditions for the development
of the middle class but these phenomenon do not explain the

emergence of populism.

It took the economic crisis of 1929,

the restriction of personal liberties under Ubico, growing

nationalism, and international political trends to forge the

populist coalition which defeated Ubico.

For more information of demographic trends see Carol A.
Smith, "El dessarrollo de la primacia urbana, la dependencia en
la exportacion y la formacion de clases en Guatemala",
Mesoamerica 8 (1984): 195-278. See also Gilda Segrada Sagot y
Jorge Arriaga, "El processo historico en la formacion urbana
Guatemalteca, 1773-1944", Anuario de Centroamerica 7 (1981): 4370.
22

Until the 1940s the middle class had
never acted
independently because strong bonds linked
them to the

landholding oligarchy.

Ties of patronage and dependence

undermined the ability of the clase media to
form themselves
into an interest group separate from the
oligarchy. The
fact that they did eventually break these ties
and formed a
separate class with distinct interests can be linked

directly to their vulnerable position in the economy.
Economic crises, brought on by fluctuations in world coffee
markets, continually exposed them to forces beyond their
control.

The Depression fostered growing discontent after

the nation's coffee economy collapsed in 1929 when

international price of coffee collapsed.
The impact of the Depression on Guatemala is
intriguing.

Although the downturn devastated the coffee

economy, it actually stimulated domestic production of

foodstuffs because imports became comparatively expensive.
This had the effect of actually stimulating the national

economy from about 1934 onwards (see the graph below)

.

Thus

the worst effects of the Depression had passed as early as
1933.

The pressure on the middle class resulted from their

links to government because state expenditures also

plummeted as taxes from the coffee trade dried up.

Since

import and export duties supplied the government with around

23
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90% of its revenues, the coffee slump spelled
trouble for

government employees.

in the worst years of the Depression,

Ubico "deferred" civil servant's salaries.
The middle class felt the greatest economic
pressure,
however, when World War II began.
The wartime disruption of
trade with Europe and the United States sent Guatemala's

dependent economy into another tailspin.

Production, which

had expanded in the years following the collapse of
1929,

plummeted, and the ensuing economic contraction set off

a

vicious bout of inflation which undermined the middle class'
tenuous economic security.

The chart below graphically

captures the extent of the crisis brought on by World War
II.

28

This chart shows the enigmatic reaction of Guatemala s
economy to the Depression After a brief downturn between 1929
and 1933, the economy experienced very substantial growth. This
growth occurred mostly because of the expansion of production for
domestic consumption This economic enigma has yet to be
explained satisfactorily by economic historians, but it provides
interesting questions for further research
1

.

.
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The economic problems brought on by World War II

convinced the middle class that they needed political power
to save themselves from falling back into the ranks of the

lower class.

The very economic forces which formed it,

the clase media to demand political power.

led

The economic

booms and busts also persuaded the bourgeoisie that they had
to "modernize"

Guatemala's economy. For generations they

experienced, on

a

of dependency.

When coffee prices fell or droughts hit,

very personal level, the devastating price

Based on Victor Bulmer Thomas, The Political Economy of
Central America since 1920 (Cambridge, 1987), Table A3, 312. The
statistics are adjusted to take inflation into account.
25

their government jobs disappeared,
their law practices
atrophied, their teaching jobs were cut. 30

Ubico -s restriction of political freedoms
exacerbated
tensions caused by the economic crisis. His
repressive

policies contributed to middle class mobilization
behind
populist demands. Just as the economy had expanded

in the

1920s,

so too had political freedoms.

The fall of the

dictator Estrada Cabrera in 1920 initiated a brief period
of
increased political freedom. 31

This era of liberty ended,

however, when Jorge Ubico seized power in 1931.

Although he

came to power promising reforms, as his term progressed it

became clearer and clearer that he would tolerate no dissent
and that he could not or would not deliver the promised
reforms. He tightened his grip throughout the 1930s and

increased harassment of the few opponents who dared to

challenge him openly.

By 1944 Ubico had complete control of

This scaling back of government expenditures during
Ubico* s reign testify to the middle class tenuous position.
Although the economy had recovered by 1933, government
expenditures remained well below 1928 levels for more than a
Ubico' s fiscal restraint translated into lost jobs for
decade.
many teachers and civil servants. For more on this see Kenneth
Greib's Guatemalan Caudillo, the Regime Of Jorge Ubico, Guatemala
1931-1944 (athens, Ohio, 1979), 54.
31

John Holger Petersen, "The Political Role of University
Students in Guatemala, 1944-1968" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Pittsburgh, 1969), 56.
26

the country, and the repression of his reign is
still

infamous in Guatemala today.

Ubico's spying, censorship, and harassment of opponents
bothered the middle class which felt that such repression
proved the backwardness of their country.

During the

political opening of the 1920s, many members of the clase
media nad become accustomed to freedom of expression and
other civil rights.

So Ubico's iron-fisted policies drove

many to oppose him and the old ways of governing that he
represented.

By repressing his opponents, the dictator only

fed the middle class' resentment.

A good example of middle class discontent arising out
of Ubico's repression occurred at the University of San

Carlos. During the 1920s, the predominantly middle class

university students initiated a movement to press for
institutional autonomy, student input into administrative
matters, and curricula revisions.

This effort reflected a

similar drive throughout Latin America known as the

University Reform Movement, which began at the Argentine
University of Cordoba in 1918.

The students had largely

achieved their goals of autonomy and student co-government
of San Carlos when Ubico seized power and reversed their

gains. 32

32

Ibid.,

He soon placed the university under the direct

57.

27

control of the Ministry of Education and the
students lost
their input in administrative matters. This
reversal bred
resentment against Ubico in a vital sector of the
middle
class.

The students' alienation assured that Ubico would

have an articulate and influential opposition to contend

with in the coming years.

Growing nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiment also
fostered the growth of populism.
a

National pride surfaced as

direct result of Guatemalans' increasing awareness of

their country's underdevelopment and dependence. 33

An

anonymous U.S. government observer in 1944 summarized the
elements which fed these feelings when he stated,
The current factors of insecurity are related to a
more general background of insecurities: a
primitive, impoverished Indian population ruled by
an absolute dictator, a national economy largely
dependent on two export crops, coffee and bananas,
and a general agricultural backwardness which

Dependency here is used as a descriptive term which refers
to concrete structural conditions which govern the economic life
of a country.
It is a situation in which a country's development
is tied to the export of a single crop for export to an extremely
Economic growth within a dependent country is
limited market.
determined by external factors and not by domestic conditions.
There are many other definitions of dependency, but this simple
definition highlights the structural relationship of underdeveloped nations to their markets, and the overall impact on the
economy.
In the case of Guatemala, a strong dependency developed
over time on the U.S. both as a market for Guatemala's goods and
as a source of manufactured goods.
28
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leaves four-fifths of the land totally
uncultivated. 34

The agrarian oligarchy became the symbol of Guatemala's

backwardness for the growing opposition and fueled middle
class resentment.

Their large estates, called fincas

.

dominated the economy, producing coffee and bananas for
export and contributing over 95 percent of the total value
of Guatemala's exports.

Coffee alone, however, provided

nearly three quarters of the country's export earnings,

making it the linchpin of the entire economic order.

The

coffee oligarchy's complete control of the economy convinced
a

growing number of Guatemalans that thorough structural

reforms were the only antidote to the nation's

underdevelopment.

The banana industry, however, provided

a

base of

operation for the single most important symbol of the
nation's economic problems, the United Fruit Company. This

company's activities, more than any other, fueled Guatemalan

nationalism by providing

a

very concrete example of the

nation's economic backwardness. UFCO, a Boston-based

multinational corporation, had

a de

facto stranglehold over

State Department, "Current Factors of Insecurity in
Guatemala" O.S.S. /State Department Special Report, November
12,1944, from O.S.S. /State Department Intelligence and Research
Reports; Latin America, 1941-1960 (Washington, 1975)
34

U.S.
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the economy which stemmed from its
control (through

subsidiaries and affiliated companies) of the
nation's
ports, railroads, shipping lines and electric
company.

Because of its dominant position in the economy,
"La
Frutera" ,as UFCO was called, could punish those
who opposed
it through freight rate manipulation or by
denying them
an

outlet for their produce.

Though they only commanded a

small fraction of the economy, UFCO and its subsidiaries

controlled Guatemala's economic development by directing the
flow of commerce.

The power wielded by the company

distorted the nation's development by conditioning economic
growth on corporate decisions made in a Boston board room,
rather than on priorities set within the country.

Increasing reliance on the U.S. between 1931 and 1944
for both imports and trade outlets fuelled nationalism. The

percentage of Guatemalan products consumed by North
Americans grew steadily under Ubico and as

dependence on U.S. markets deepened.

a

result

In 1936 Guatemala sent

just under 60 percent of its exports to the northern

colossus.

The disruption of links with Europe during World

War II broke the old trade patterns, and by 1941, Guatemala

relied on its northern neighbor to buy almost 80 percent of

30

,

its exports. 35

Guatemala also depended more and more on the
gringos as a source for imports. The strengthening
of

dependent relations forced the Guatemalan middle
class to
question the benefits of such reliance on the
greedy and
expansionist yankees.
In the face of growing discontent, the Guatemalan

bourgeoisie sought ways to articulate and legitimize its
demands for structural reform and political liberalization.
The global struggle between fascism and democracy provided
the ideal rhetorical underpinnings for their challenge to

oligarchic control.

Roosevelt's progressive policies in the

U.S. and the issuing of the Atlantic Charter clearly showed

that democracy and economic opportunity were global
concerns.

The Guatemalan middle class clearly felt

themselves part of a broader struggle against oppression.
The middle class also looked to Latin America's

populist regimes when they sought a model for change.

The

reforms of Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas constituted an

important frame of reference.

Other leaders offered

promising examples as well; Argentina's Peron, Peru's Haya
de la Torre, and Brazil's Vargas each presented variations

John Adler, Eugene Schlesinger, and Ernest Olson, Public
Finance and Economic Development in Guatemala (Stanford, 1952)
See also Kenneth Greib, Guatemalan Caudillo. the Reg ime of
38.
Jorge Ubico. Guatemala 1931-1944 (Athens, Ohio, 1979), 147.
31

on the populist theme.

These leaders articulated programs

which promised democracy and economic development.

They

showed that a distinctly Latin American political
form did
exist that could transform the continent.

Many Guatemalan politicians spent years exiled in Peru,
Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, and they drew inspiration
from
the changes they witnessed there.

Although no single

populist formula existed, Latin American nations

experimented with

a

variety of political forms which

combined economic restructuring with the expansion of
political participation.

Exiled Guatemalans saw these

reforms enacted in their host countries and decided that
such models could address their own society's under-

development and dependency.
In 1944, the middle class seized power from the old

oligarchy.

The act of taking power and seeking solutions to

the problems facing Guatemala temporarily welded together
the opposition.

Surging nationalism, demands for political

liberalization, and the general crisis of the old oligarchic

economic system combined to spur the development of populism
in Guatemala.

The middle class wanted power to control

their own destinies and to develop the nation. Without the

economic problems of the period and the repressive nature of

32

Ubico's regime, however, it is probable that
Guatemala would
never have experienced the populist challenge of
1944.

33
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CHAPTER

4

THE REVOLUTION
(May 1944 - March 1945)

The Revolution passed through five distinct phases

between the overthrow of Ubico and the inauguration of
Juan
Jose Arevalo Bermejo, and each one of these phases
illustrates a specific aspect of the populist nature of

Guatemala's Revolution.

The first phase lasted from the

first tremors of social unrest in early May 1944 to Ubico'

overthrow in July. The formation of an urban, multiclass
political movement with middle class leadership defined this
early period.

The second phase lasted from General Ponce's

appointment as president by Ubico in July until the return
of Arevalo from Argentine exile in September.

The formation

of a number of political parties and labor unions

characterized this phase.

The expansive nature of the

Revolution became clear in these months.
The broad and populist character of the Revolution did
not take definitive shape until the third phase.

Arevalo 's

return from exile marked the beginning of this phase which
lasted until the armed revolt of October 20th, 1944.

His

charismatic leadership bound the coalition together in an
open challenge to Ponce's plans to remain in power.

The

period from late October 1944 to February 1945 constitutes

34
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the vital fourth phase of the Revolution
because of the
important reform carried out by the Junta which
took over
after Ponce's ouster.

The final phase lasted from February to March of
1945
as the revolutionaries drafted and debated
a new
constitution.

They defined much of the nature of post-Ubico

Guatemala through the constitutional changes they imposed.
The expansion of political participation through the

extension of suffrage characterized this period.
The promulgation of the Constitution of 1945 on March
13

and Arevalo's inauguration two days later signalled the

triumph of the Revolution.

The revolutionaries had

succeeded in constructing the basis for a new sociopolitical order in Guatemala.

From this point onwards the

challenge became translating the vague promises of economic

transformation and expanded political participation into
reality.
A. The June Revolution
(May - June 1944)

In May of 1944, full-fledged public opposition to Ubico

emerged for the first time.

The caudillo

'

opponents had

planned and plotted secretly, but in early 1944 they began
openly challenging the aging tyrant. During this period a

broad-based coalition emerged which drew on all social
35

classes for it support.

The middle class, however, provided

decisive leadership, much as it had in other
populist
movements. The aspect of populism which emerged

most

clearly before June, 1944 therefore, was the
urban, middle
class leadership of a broad multi-class movement.
The overthrow of Maximilliano Hernandez Martinez,
the

dictator of neighboring El Salvador, in April by

a

student-

led non-violent movement proved to be the event which
set

the Guatemalan opposition in motion. 36

The success of a

non-violent movement in El Salvador led them to believe that
they too could oppose dictatorship with passive resistance.
The development of a peaceful strategy for opposing Ubico

drew on similar plans employed against dictators in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Non-

violence provided Ubico' s opponents with the practical means
for ridding themselves of tyranny. 37

For an interesting and careful historical study of the
overthrow of Hernandez Martinez see Patricia Parkman's Nonviolent
Insurrection in El Salvador; The fall of Maximilliano Hernandez
Martinez (Tucson, 1988)
This book is the most recent
contribution to the literature on the topic, and it gives
insights into the awareness of non-violence among the opposition
in El Salvador and their use of passive resistance to bring down
the dictator.
.

37

The idea of passive resistance was the basis of the early
strategy against Ubico, and numerous State Department documents
detail plans for non-violent resistance to the regime by the
For an example of this see DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI
opposition.
See also Clamp, "The Overthrow of
Report, June 22 1944, 12-23.
Jorge Ubico".
36

The overbearing presence of Ubico, with
his arbitrary,
personalistic rule, seemed archaic to the
opposition. They
desperately wanted to free Guatemala from caudillismo
and

bring it into the world of the Four Freedoms
and the

Atlantic Charter.

The people of other Latin American

nations had successfully rejected dictatorship and the

Guatemalans wanted to do the same.

Opposition sprang up

throughout the country, but Guatemala City became the
epicenter of the revolt against Ubiquismo

.

All of the major

confrontations in this phase, and throughout the entire
Revolution, took place in the capital. 38

The revolt, in

essence, was an urban affair.

A group of forty-five prominent lawyers set off

a

chain

reaction of open defiance to Ubico in May of 1944 when they

requested the removal of a number of judges who held

jurisdiction over the trials of the dictator's opponents. 39
In the hope of diffusing the situation, Ubico acquiesced and

removed the judges.

Within weeks teachers pressed the

regime for wage and benefit increases.

The narrative of events in this section is drawn from
several sources the most important of which are DOS 814.00/72444, FBI Report, June 22, 1944 and Christine Clamp "The Overthrow
of Jorge Ubico".
39
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The lawyers' success provided inspiration
for students
at the University who in turn provided
leadership
for the

movement as a whole/ 0
(

The University Students Association

Asociacion de Estudiantes U niversitar

in 1943,

played

a

pivotal role/

1

m

i
r

or AEU)

,

founded

addition to represent-

ing the university students, the AEU congress held
the

allegiance of a broad grouping of professionals and alumni.
They spoke for hospital interns, court clerks, and teachers
at primary and secondary schools because of these groups

ties to the university.

in the legal profession a strong

link existed between the university and former law students

because many junior partners in law firms continued taking
classes as they worked. 42

Students also filled the lower

levels of the civil service.

Because of their involvement

in the professional community, the government, and the

university the students were in a unigue position to
mobilize middle class discontent behind populist demands.
The students began slowly pressuring the dictator on
June

3,

by requesting the removal of Dr. Ramiro Galvez,

the

For an excellent account by a participant which captures
the role of the University students see Manuel Galich's Del
(Guatemala, 1977)
panico al ataque
,

41

Galich, Del panico al ataque

42

Silvert, Guatemala
ataque 243-275.

.

6.

,

225-230.

See also Galich, Del panico al

,
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dean of the Medical School and Dr. Oscar Espada,
secretary
of the Medical faculty.

The students despised the two men

because Ubico had appointed them to control the rebellious
university.

Galvez and Espada personified dictatorial rule

within the university community. 43

To the surprise of

everyone, particularly the universitarios

,

Ubico agreed to

their removal and replaced them with individuals more

acceptable to the students.

This concession, another

attempt to diffuse tension, opened the way for more student
demands. 44

The students moved quickly to capitalize on their first
success, and momentum began to gather.

On June

7,

students

in the School of Pharmacy circulated petitions requesting

the removal of their dean, Licenciado Soto, as well as

demanding curricula reforms.

They subsequently submitted

the petitions to Ubico 's Minister of Public Education, and
the dean resigned. 45

Students in the School of Economic

Science made a similar move when they demanded the

resignation of the Secretary of their faculty, Licenciado

DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, July 22,

Clamp,

1944,

1.

"The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 71.

DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944,

2.

Jimenez Pinto. Pinto also offered his
resignation
immediately. 46

All of Ubico's appointed officials at the
University

appeared to be doomed.

On June 18, the Law students

followed the lead of students in other Schools by
requesting
that Ubico remove Victor Mijanos, the newly appointed
Dean
of their faculty, who they claimed was unfit for the
post

because of his addiction to alcohol. They also demanded the
removal of Carlos Giron Zirion, the Secretary of the Faculty

whose close ties to Ubico made him undesirable.

The

students offered a list of prominent attorneys who would be

acceptable and left the choice up to Ubico. 47
The law students raised the stakes on June 19 when they
informed Ubico that they would boycott classes if he did not

accede to their demands.

The dictator informed a delegation

of students that he would honor their request only if they

would immediately resume attendance of classes.

The fact

that he met all of the demands reflected the student's

influential position in the society as a whole.

Peasants

and worker were often shot or imprisoned simply for making

demands, and their petitions were rarely met by the

caudillo.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

The students, however, were the future doctors,

40

lawyers, teachers and civil servants
which society relied on
for vital services.
They were also the sons and daughters
of Guatemala's respectable middle
class.

Ubico thought that he could neutralize the
students'
complaints by making some simple personnel changes.

This

miscalculation backfired when instead of being pacified,
the
universitarios got bolder and bolder. As they pressed

their

demands it became clear that Ubico could not satiate
them

without appearing weak.
The struggle escalated on June 21 when the AEU drafted
a

new set of demands.

They insisted that Ubico release

several imprisoned universitarios who had been held for six

months without charges for their involvement in the

University Students Association. 48

The group threatened to

shut down the university and walk off their jobs as primary
and secondary teachers within 24 hours if Ubico did not

release their colleagues and institute reforms at the

University.

The students called for university autonomy,

a

purge of

political appointees at the school, increased input into

university affairs and job security for professors.
Interestingly, they included in the petition

request for

a

an immediate wage increase for all members of the University

DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944,

5

Students Association who taught at the
primary or secondary
level.
Their demands reflected a clear self-interest.
They
did not demand any changes in the
government; they

articulated specific grievances of the university
community.
The students organized effectively to achieve
their
goals,

but they had not yet come out in full rebellion
against

caudillismo

.

Ubico recognized that the scope of the universitarios
demands expanded each time he conceded. He understood that
he had to stop them while they continued to address their

own parochial concerns, while they remained isolated.

Stopping the students, in the end, proved very difficult.
Ubico' s decision to suspend constitutional guarantees
on June 22, changed the nature of the protests/ 9

His

decree stated that such extreme measures were made necessary
by

Nazi-fascist tendencies trying to obstruct
maintenance of order so necessary at the present
time because of the extraordinary circumstances
created by the struggle which exists in the world
in defense of democratic institutions and the
freedom of nations. 50

El Imparcial

.

June 22, 1944.

814.00/7-2444, FBI report July 22, 1944,
42

6.

Ubico masked the suspension in anti-fascist
rhetoric, but
the point was clear; the students had gone
too far. All

national papers carried the decree, and throughout
Guatemala
City officials read it aloud with the accompaniment
of

martial music.

This decree was Ubico «s greatest blunder. Even his

closest advisers recognized the politically explosive nature
of the student's demands.

The professional community, and

the middle class generally, supported the students and urged

them on.

The AEU responded quickly and effectively to

Ubico s state of siege.
1

Within hours, twelve public schools

and all of the "national" schools

called strikes.

Soon the

hospital interns, court employees, and university students

walked away from their jobs.

By June 24, every lawyer in

Guatemala City had closed down their offices. Doctors
refused to work at the hospital, although clinics remained
open.

This upheaval began to take its toll on Ubico and his
associates.

On June 23, the dictator convened the first

cabinet meeting of his term. Prior to the strike,
dealt with all major decisions himself.

he had

Because of the

magnitude of the crisis, he now felt he needed to discuss
the situation with his lackeys.

51

Ibid.,

12

43

Various ministers

immediately tendered their resignations,
but Ubico refused
to accept them.
His secretary, Dr. Guillermo Cruz,
made the
point that they could show no weakness in
the face
of such

volatile conditions, because any resignations
might lead to
demands for the resignation of Ubico himself. 52
Cruz spoke

these prophetic words even as the opposition grew
stronger
and more unified every day.

The cabinet adjourned, resolved

to hang on until the bitter end.

The next day, June 24, 1944, two lawyers, Jorge Serrano
and Frederico Carbonell, presented Ubico with a petition,

known as the Memorial de los 311
of constitutional guarantees.

.

demanding the restoration

The Memorial stated,

Guatemala cannot remove itself from the democratic
imperatives of the era.
It is impossible to
frustrate with coercive means the uncontainable
impulses of that generous ideology which is being
reaffirmed in the world's conscience by means of
the bloodiest struggle between oppression and
liberty. 53
The petition was a powerful testament to the broad multi-

class nature of the Revolution.

The list of signatories

read like a Who's Who of Guatemala society.

Members of the

old elite, lawyers, industrialists, doctors, and even

York,

52

Ibid.,

53

Roland Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (New
1959),

14.

11.
44

Ubico -s close friends signed. After
the submission of this
petition no one could doubt the breadth of
the movement
against Ubico.
The students' demands for reform at the
University
faded into the background as the opposition moved
to define
a

broader agenda.

The AEU, however, continued to provide

leadership to the expanding movement.

demonstrations on June 24.

They organized two

The first manifestation took

place at noon with about 500 students and a large crowd of

supporters.

The group gathered in the central plaza in

front of the National Palace and marched through the city.
The police and the army did not molest the demonstrators and
the crowd dispersed without incident. 54

At 6:00 p.m. that same day, the students mobilized for
a

second, larger demonstration with over 800 students and

numerous supporters.
the business district.

The group formed a procession through

They then systematically began to

disrupt theatres, nightclubs, and restaurants, entering and
forcing the patrons to leave.

closed down the city ceter.

These actions effectively

Again the police and army did

not harass the marchers. 55

DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944,

Clamp,

"The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 81.
45

14.

That evening, however, Ubico resorted
to the tactics he
knew best to intimidate his opposition.
He gave a group of
police agents free reign in the city and as
much
alcohol as

they could drink.

The mob attacked the suburb of Colonia

Ubico and disrupted a fair, destroyed
halls, and much other property.

a

beer parlor, dance

Looting and robbing, the

mob proceeded into the central district of the
capital.

Another mob caused similar damage in the Avenida Bolivar
district.

Ubico used these "riots" by his own agents as a

pretext for continuing the state of emergency. 56
The next day, June 25, another group of lawyers went

directly to Ubico and demanded
suspending civil liberties.

a

repeal of the decree

They backed up their demand

with the threat that the doctors and pharmacists would join
the strike the following day.

Ubico politely heard the

jurists out and then dismissed them, making only vague

promises and stressing the unsettled conditions which forced
him to take such "regrettable" actions. 57
By 11:00 A.M. the opposition gathered again in the

central plaza and once again marched through the business
district. Ubico, however, decided to up the ante. Police,

56

Silvert, Guatemala
June 22 1944, 16-19.
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,

6,

and DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report,

DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944, 20.
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army and cavalry units dispersed the
crowds using corrosive
chemical bombs and truncheons. 58
Several people received
serious burns from the chemicals and shrapnel
wounds from
the bombs
In response to the violence of the morning
demonstra-

tion, the opposition decided that only women should
march

that evening, presuming that Ubico would not fire on them. 59
As described in the introduction, a group of about 60 women

gathered and marched through the city dressed in black and
reciting the rosary. 60

Ubico, however, could not allow such

an open challenge to his authority and he ordered troops to

fire on the procession.

Two women died in the street and

stray bullets wounded 80 others. 61

The movement now had

martyrs, and the demands changed from humble reguests for

their rights to forceful calls for Ubico 's resignation and

a

thorough transformation of Guatemalan society. 62
The strike spread further, and people waited for
Ubico' s response.

An outraged populace flooded the National

58

Ibid.
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Christine Anne Clamp "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 89.
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Palace with petitions, but the demonstrations
ceased as the
entire nation waited to see how Ubico would
respond.

In the ensuing days, however, the opposition
began

pressuring Ubico 's associates to convince him to resign
or
to resign in protest themselves.
Ernesto Viteri
Bertrand
y

and his law partner Eugenio Silva y Pena convinced Ubico
-s

chief of police, Colonel David Ordonez to talk to the aging
dictator.

Ubico fired Ordonez on the spot for suggesting

that he resign. 63

The opposition also convinced the

Minister of Finance, Jose Gonzales to resign. 64
On June 29, 1944, Ubico resigned himself.

The 66 year

old caudillo had decided in April that if events got out of

control he would rather leave peacefully than "with blood on
his hands." 65

Feeling betrayed by the number of his close

friends who had signed the Memorial five days earlier and

wanting to avoid further bloodshed, Ubico retired to his
coffee

f inca

near the town of Antigua. 66

Ubico chose General Frederico Ponce Vaides to form

a

military triumvirate with Generals Eduardo Villagran Ariza
and Buenaventura Pineda.

63

Clamp,

The selection process reveals how
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little it mattered who specifically
replaced the dictator.
Throughout his regime, the generals who
did not hold regular

commands gathered daily at the National Palace
to serve as
errand boys and troubleshooters for the dictator.
The day
Ubico decided to resign, there were only three
retired

generals in his outer office due to the early hour.

He

appointed them to be the members of the troika which would
run the country because they happened to be present at the

right time, not because they were close associates or

particularly competent. 67

These three generals formed the

public face of the transitional government which was, in the
end,

a

government of all of Ubico' s generals.

They

represented Ubiauismo without Ubico.
The resignation of Ubico had come about because of the
rapid formation of a broad-based, urban movement which

mobilized to demand political change.

The students had been

forced by events to move beyond their parochial demands and
lead a multi-class political movement against the

dictatorship and in favor of reform.

During the next phases

of this populist revolution, the middle class leadership

faced the challenge of transforming opposition to Ubico into

Kenneth Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution
of 1944" The Americas 32:4 (April 1976), 532.
67

,

49

coherent political movement for
structural changes in
Guatemala's socio-economic system.
a

B.The Pones Interreg num
(July - September 1944)

The appointment of Ubico's triumvirate
marked the
beginning of the next phase of the Revolution,
the battle
over the fate of Post-Ubico Guatemala. Two
processes

characterized this phase. First, activists founded the
political parties and labor unions which provided the base
of support for the populist coalition which would rule
the

country for the following decade.

And the second was the

long struggle between the triumvirate and the opposition for
power.

During this time the middle class leadership of the

movement had to articulate its vision of

a

new Guatemala and

the vague outlines of the populist reforms they proposed

took shape. In short, this period witnessed the expansion of

political activity and the emergence of a unified populist

opposition with a nebulous political agenda.

The

unification took place as the many political parties formed
a

broad electoral front behind the candidacy of Juan Jose

Arevalo to oust Ponce and the triumvirate from power.
Political programs, however, were the furthest thing
from the mind of Guatemalans as news of Ubico's resignation

swept through the city. Thousands flooded into the streets

to celebrate.

They had brought down the tyrant.

The

triumvirate removed all troops from the
city and let the
people celebrate. Only later would it become
clear

that

Ponce intended to maintain Ubico's system
more or less
intact with a new dictator at the helm.
In the tumultuous days following Ubico's
departure, the

citizens of the city tested the limits of their new
freedom.
When the National Assembly convened on the 4th of July,

crowds packed the galleries, determined to make their voices
heard.

The crowd's disruptive enthusiasm forced the old

Ubiquista Assembly to adjourn after accepting Ubico's
resignation.

The police and army moved in and cleared the

Assembly hall. 69

In a closed session, the lawmakers,

shaken

by the anarchy in their chamber, appointed Ponce the

Provisional President of Guatemala, with police and troops

protecting them from "the forces of disorder."
The period from Ponce's appointment in early July to
the return of Arevalo in early September provided the

opposition with the opportunity to forge coalitions and
political parties.

Ponce had announced that election would

be held in November to elect a new president.

The

opposition began preparations immediately.

El Imoarcial

.

July

4,

1944.

DOS 814.00/7-444, FBI Report, July

4,

1944,

7.

.

The National Renovation Party
(Partidp_Renoyaclpn
Nacipnal, referred to throughout as
the RN) became the first
opposition party when it formed on the same
day that Ubico
resigned.
It played a major role in the months
to come and
throughout the Revolution. Because intellectuals
and

professionals made up the bulk of its members, however,
the
RN remained a relatively small party.
The Popular
Liberating Front

(

Frente Popular Libertadnra

r

or FPL)

,

the

other major revolutionary party, also formally organized
itself during this phase.

Students and young professionals

who had links to the University formed the majority of the
FPL's membership.

The RN and FPL soon began unifying behind

the candidacy of Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, an

unassuming pedagogue who became the focus of hopes for
Guatemala.

a

new

Arevalo rapidly emerged as the opposition's

candidate of choice because of his strong appeal with the

University students, who were the heart and soul of the
movement
Arevalo' s background helped him garner support among a

population that knew very little about him.

Born in 1904 in

Santa Rosa province, the future president was of rural

middle class origin. His father owned and worked

52

a

small

farm and his mother taught in a
local school. 70

Because of

his mother's connections he gained
entry to the renowned
Pamplona Normal School from the age of six
and from then on

received instruction at the nation's best
schools in
Guatemala City, in 1927, Arevalo received
Guatemala's most
prestigious scholarship for study abroad, and spent
the next
seven years in Argentina pursuing a doctorate in
education,

which he completed in 1934.
In 1934, he returned to Guatemala and quickly entered
the civil service.

Ubico appointed him Subsecretary for

Public Education, a post he held for two years before

becoming disillusioned with the caudillo's repressive rule.

Arevalo felt sure the dictator would not allow him an

opportunity to try his ideas for educational reform, so he
chose voluntary exile rather than the constant frustration
of remaining in Guatemala. He decided to return to Argentina

where he worked as

a

Professor of Education at the

University of Tucuman.

He remained there until the fall of

The following section on Arevalo 's background is based on
an extensive commentary by the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina. This
document was not given a number in the DOS microfilm series, but
it is referred to as "Despatch no. 17049, dated January 19th,
1945 from American Embassy, Buenos Aires entitled Antecedents of
Juan Jose Arevalo, President elect of Guatemala'". Additional
information is drawn from DOS 814.00/10-3044, "Confidential
Report #1355-55, Major Victor Rose, Assistant Military Attache",
October 30, 1944.
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1944 when he travelled home once
again to his native land to

become the opposition's candidate
for the presidency.
Arevalo's profession, background, and
reputation
combined to make him the ideal person
to bind together the
disparate elements of the revolutionary
coalition. The

students respected him because he was an
educator, and the
faculty knew of him through his pedagogical
writings. His
rural, middle class background gave him an
understanding of

the problems of both urban and rural communities.

The fact

that he had no ties to either the old landed oligarchy
or
the military also worked in his favor.

Guatemalan politics

had always been dominated by these two groups, and the

revolutionaries sought a complete outsider to the political
system, where even many opposition figures had been

compromised.

Because of these factors and because of his

credentials as a fervent advocate of democracy, Arevalo
became the standard bearer of the opposition by mid-summer
of 1944, with the RN and FPL cooperating extensively to

support his candidacy.

This informal coalition later became

the Frente Unidos de Partidos Politicos Arevalista (The

United Front of Arevalist Political Parties or FUPPA)
The organization of labor unions paralleled the

formation of political parties during Ponce's reign.

71

DOS 814.00/1-845, Long to Hull, January 8th,
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.

.

Although only two unions actually formed
with legal
recognition, numerous guilds, mutual aid
societies and
worker's groups coalesced in the summer of
1944. The railway
workers formed the first union in the weeks
following
Ubico's fall.

m

early July, they voted to change their

mutual aid society into a full-fledged union, the
Sindicato
de Accion y Mejoramiento

FP. rrocarriel

em

(known as SAMF)

.

SAMF became one of the strongest unions in Guatemala
and,

within a year, had roughly 5,000 members. 72

The union

proved to be a vital force in the nascent Guatemalan labor

movement

73

Another important step for Guatemala's union movement
came when the teachers also began organizing.
1944,

In July,

educators laid the foundation for the Sindicato de

Trabai dores en Educacion de Guatemala (known as STEG)

Although the union did not officially form until January
1945, the teachers recruited members and advocated their

interests throughout this period.
In the nine months after SAMF and the teacher's group

organized no less than 15 other unions formed.

Carpenters,

masons, tailors, construction workers, and cobblers all set

72
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^Edwin Bishop, "The Guatemalan Labor Movement, 1944-1959"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1959), 9.
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up unions between July 1944
and May 1945.

represented more than 43,000 workers. 74
existed prior to the fall of Ubico.

These groups

Not one union had

The unions became an

effective political force and joined the
opposition to
Ponce's plans to remain in power. Through
the unions,

many

groups of workers gained a political voice.
The unions and the two major political parties

coalesced into a strong unified movement in this period.
The need to clearly articulate a political vision
forced the

opposition to begin formulating

a

platform.

The workers

began discussing labor rights; teachers called for an all
out effort to eradicate illiteracy; lawyers called for

political reforms, and together they called for

restructuring of the old order.

a

The vague outlines of the

populist reforms which would be carried out in the following
years emerged in this period.

The input of diverse social

sectors combined into a disparate and sometimes jumbled

vision of the future, but in the months that followed the

revolutionaries would slowly define their platform, thereby

defining the nature and extent of reform.

DOS 814.504/5145, Long to State, May
56
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c

Arevalo's Return
(September - October 1944)
«

Arevalo's return from exile in Argentina
on September
3, 1944 changed the atmosphere dramatically.
The opposition
now had a leader to rally behind.
in this
period, the

former educator bound the diverse elements
of the

revolutionary coalition together with his increasingly
charismatic leadership.

Without the emergence of

a

personal istic leader with charisma, Guatemala's Revolution
could not have become

sense of the word.

a

populist movement in the fullest

I

After his return, Arevalo was able to

carry his message to the people.

And he went from being a

writer to being a political leader.

Arevalo's ideology

became the ideology of the opposition as a whole.
Aprismo, Argentina had Peronismo

and now Guatemala had its

.

own populist doctrine, Arevalismo

Peru had

.

On his arrival at Guatemala City's Aurora airport,

Arevalo received an ecstatic welcome from thousands of
supporters. 75

A mass of wellwishers flooded into the

streets of the city to see the motorcade pass in the largest

demonstrations since the overthrow of Ubico.

It took his

car hours to reach the city center where an huge rally

El Imparcial

,

September 4th, 1944.
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.

greeted him.

The message was clear:

.

Arevalo would be a

formidable political opponent. 76

The idealistic former teacher had become

a symbol of

democratic change, but he faced the arduous
task of leading
the opposition to electoral victory.
He was in the unusual
position of heading a group he did not know, in
a country he
had not lived in for a decade.
His greatest challenge was
to translate his popularity as an anonymous exile
into

coherent political support for his campaign.

Arevalo struggled in the early months to define his
ideas which he called "spiritual socialism.

1,77

In

explaining this vague set of principles, he stressed more
than anything the things they were not. He rejected
materialist, socialism and capitalism, seeking a "third way,"
a

unique solution to Guatemala's problems.

Arevalo

attempted to formulate an alternative path to development,
just as every other Latin American populist leader had done.

One of the best sources on Arevalo and the events of this
period can be found in his autobiographical work El Candidato
Blanco v el Huracan (Guatemala, 1984)

^Arevalo' s writings are extensive. For his early works see
his Escritos politicos (Guatemala, 1945) which he wrote in exile
in the early 1940s. Later essays from the period 1944-1947 are
collected in his Discursos en la presidencia (Guatemala, 1948)
One of the most interesting selection of his writings are in his
autobiographical memoir on this period, El candidato bianco v el
huracan. 1944-1945 (Guatemala, 1984).
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in explaining "spiritual
socialism," Arevalo stressed
dignity, social good, and equality
of opportunity.
In his

earliest writings from exile he declared

-

We are socialists because we live in
the twentieth
century But we are not materialist
socialists. We
do not believe that man is primarily a
stomach. We
believe that man is above all a will for
socialism does not, therefore, aim
at an ingenious distribution of material
goods,
the stupid economic equalization of men who are of
socialism aims at
liberating men psychologically, guaranteeing to
all the psychological and spiritual integrity
denied by conservatism and liberalism. 78
His ideas did not change appreciably in the intervening

years between exile and his return home. 79

In February of

194 5 during a speech he emphasized dignity again. He stated:

A few days ago, the railway workers' organization
proclaimed a general strike which threatened to be
a serious social and political problem; but these
boys were not asking for higher salaries; but on
the contrary, they were putting their economic
position in danger in their effort to effect the
expulsion from the company of a chief who took
pleasure in crushing the dignity of Guatemalan
workers. They were fighting therefore for

Quoted in Schneider, Communism in Guatemala

,

17.

^An interesting series of U.S. documents explain Arevalo 's
ideas as Americans tried to understand what his popularity would
mean for U.S. Guatemalan relations. See DOS 814.00/7-1444, Long
to Hull, July 14, 1944, DOS 814.00/8-2144, Long to Hull, August
DOS 814.00/8-2544, Long to Hull, August 21, 1944, and
DOS 814.00/9-1444, Long to Hull, September 1, 1944.
21,

1944,
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ignit is a spiritual quality and
?
Y
niT^l^™*
not
a material
quality. 80

With such declarations Arevalo
gained more and more support
from workers and peasants unaccustomed
to hearing a

presidential candidate discuss their concerns.

He spoke of

changing the system of land tenure, providing
health care to
the poor and enforcing labor laws to
protect them. Although
only a small number of universifcari n« and
lawyers knew of
him in July, by early October Arevalo had extended
his

support into new social sectors. By mid-October, he had

garnered far more support than any other candidate. 81

Arevalo showed that he could translate

a

vague body of

political ideals into concrete support for his candidacy in
these months.

What had been a broad movement without any

single leader now had an individual to draw them together.
This task was simplified by the fact that Arevalo 's

political ideals were somewhat amorphous.

In essence, by

remaining vague about the specifics of reform, he became all
things to all people, personifying the aspirations of all

sectors of the coalition. In this respect, Arevalo typified
Latin American populist leaders, and the instant support he

80
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received from the populace on his
return transformed h im
into the leader which the
movement so desperately

needed.

The interesting fact here is that
Arevalo became the
leader of a movement which had
already coalesced. The
opposition, in essence, created Arevalo
as a charismatic
leader.
Although he proved an articulate and able
leader,
he could never have pulled the revolutionary
coalition

together simply on the basis of his guile and
personal
appeal.

He became the spokesman for the movement and
then

began to exert more and more influence as time went
on.
In some ways, Arevalo is a classic case of a man
created by

circumstance who rose to the challenge.
revolutionaries, he proved

a

Luckily for the

very canny politician, because

in the months after his return it took strong leadership to

keep them unified as Ponce increased the pressure on them in
the months to come.

Tensions mounted between the Arevalistas and the
government as it became clearer and clearer that the general
intended to run for president himself.

Ponce even

approached the Assembly to see if it would give him the
necessary constitutional amendment to make his election
legal.

Ponce raised the stakes in late August and early

September when he began to harass the opposition parties and
labor unions.

Hundreds of Indians were brought in from the

61

rural areas for independence
day celebrations on September
15th. 82 The peasants, armed
with clubs and machetes marched
through the capital on the appointed
day with pictures of
Ponce pinned to their shirts. The
night before, the police
had used them to disperse an opposition
meeting. 83 The
inhabitants of the city understood that if
they resisted
Ponce's plans to become president, he would
make them pay
dearly.
The repression paralyzed the opposition. 84

On October 1st, Ponce's thugs shot Alejandro
Cordova,
the editor of El Imparcial

newspaper. 85

r

Guatemala's largest daily

Cordova had been an outspoken critic of the

government since the last days of Ubico.

He had joined the

opposition as middle and even upper class disenchantment
with Ubico grew, and by October he had become one of the
most effective opponents of Ponce's attempts to remain in
power.

Cordova's death signalled that the regime would stop

at nothing to remain in power.

El Imparcial
September 15th - 17th, 1944. See also
Kenneth Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of
1944", 538.
.
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,
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"The Guatemalan Military in the Revolution of
1944", 538. See also DOS 814.00/9-2244, Long to State, September
22, 1944.
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Ponce increased the pressure further
in an effort to
force the opposition to accept
his presidential ambitions.
He formed a new secret police to
deal with the opposition
and began to arrest student leaders. 86
The new dictator
also closed down a number of newspapers
and radio stations
and forced others to "voluntarily" suspend
operations. 87

He

went so far as to buy up all of the newsprint
paper stocks
so that the opposition could not clandestinely
publish

papers. 88

it became more and more difficult for Arevalo's

supporters to hold meetings as the government hounded them.

While he repressed the opposition, Ponce worked to
convince the Legislative Assembly to approve his candidacy
in spite of constitutional prohibitions.

Ponce's secretary

tried to convince the members to vote for the necessary
amendment.

He summoned them in groups of four and told them

that if they did not approve the changes, things could get

complicated for them. 89

Ponce's men employed similar

tactics throughout the country, pressuring local

°°DOS 814.00/9-1944,
87
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"The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of

1944", 538.
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functionaries and prominent families
to sign a declaration
in favor of Ponce's candidacy. 90
In this tense atmosphere,
elections were held on

October 13-15 for Congressional seats
left vacant by
oligarchs unwilling to face the fury of

the populace.

William Af field, the U.S. Charge d'affaires,
wrote
sarcastically that Ponce's slate '-won by a

handsome, not to

say fantastic margin garnering 48,530 votes
out of a total
of 44,571.

» 91

The blatant fraud galvanized the opposition,

so that the only question became how and when
to rid the

country of Ponce.

Three days after the polling ended, rumblings of revolt
began.

The garrisons in Esquintla and Quetzaltenango

mutinied.

Led by junior officers, the garrisons decided to

challenge Ponce openly. These young officers provided a key
element in the challenge to Ponce's plans to remain in
power. 92

They had carefully organized themselves, and by

October they were ready to act.

Their discontent centered

on several issues related to their status and the state of

the military under the Ubiguista system, which Ponce had

90

91

Ibid.
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,

277.

92

The best source on this aspect of the Revolution is
Kenneth Greib's Article, "The Guatemalan Military and the
Revolution of 1944."
64

.

kept intact.

,

Perhaps the most important issue
was

"

servilismo ," or the lack of
professionalism within the
military.
The young officers objected to the

fact that

their institution had been reduced
to simply another arena
for Ubico and Ponce to reward
those who followed orders
blindly.
The young officers listed their reasons
for

rebellion in an article in the army's magazine,
Revista
Militar.
They pointed to:
The appointment of incompetent and ineffective
generals
- Ubico 's fear of the young officers,
- The appointment of an illiterate general
to the
position of Secretary of War because of his
usefulness to Ubico,
- Use of troops by high officials to work on
private projects
- Ponce's rule violated the constitution and the
will of the people. 3
-

The professionalism of American officers stationed in

Guatemala also inspired them.

The contrast between

themselves and the junior officers in the American forces
made them feel the indignity of Ubico
all the more intensely.

's

and Ponce's policies

The officers who plotted against

Ponce felt that the affronts committed against the

institution of the army had to be addressed, and that they
had a duty to defend the constitutional order.

93
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(Jan. /Feb. 1945)
65

,

1:2

The young officers had been working
surreptitiously
with the civilians for months, and
in October they prepared
to act.
During the summer, civilians had made
contact with
disgruntled officers within the army. The
leadership of

the

military faction came from Captain Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman,
former director of the Escuela Politecnica and,
Major
Francisco Javier Arana, commander of elite Guardia de Hnnor.
.

Arana joined the conspiracy just three weeks before
the
revolt. 94

Jorge Toriello, a well respected businessman from

Guatemala City, served as liaison between the young officers
and the opposition.

These three men provided the leadership

of the revolt which finally ousted Ponce.

On the pretense of visiting his wife's family, Arbenz

travelled to El Salvador and met with Toriello who was in
San Salvador "on business."

At this meeting Arbenz and

Toriello finalized plans for an armed revolt.

Arana

remained in Guatemala to avoid arousing suspicion and worked
to recruit other officers.

His support was the crucial

factor in the success of the revolt because of his positions
as the head of the elite Honor Guard and as a tank

commander. 95

•

The Honor Guard's support proved decisive
•

since Ponce thought of Arana and the Guard as a bulwark

94

95

Silvert, Guatemala: A Study in Government
Ibid., 8.

,

8.

against any rebellion and had
entrusted them with all of the
Government's tanks and most of the
heavy armaments. When
Arana joined the movement, he brought
the firepower
necessary to bring Ponce to his knees.

While Arbenz may have been

a

junior partner in respect

to armaments, his role as chief
officer at the Escuela

Politecnica

,

Guatemala's West Point, had gained him the

respect of the best trained and most progressive
army
officers.

Arbenz translated this respect into support from

junior officers around the country. 96

This support proved

decisive during the revolt as these officers imprisoned
their commanders and assured that the regime would get no
support from outlying garrisons.

The conspirators made the final decision to revolt on

October 15th, with most of the civilian leaders of the
opposition in hiding due to Ponce's crackdown.
presence of only
swift stroke.

a

In the

few officers, Arana and Arbenz planned a

Shortly after 1:00 A.M. on October 20, the

Honor Guard, led by Arana, began firing on the other forts
in the city.

The rebels had distributed arms to students

and workers willing to fight to augment the number of rebel
troops.

Greib,
1944

,

"

541.

With control of the country's twelve tanks and the

"The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of

support of these armed students
and workers, the rebels
rapidly subdued the two loyal
garrisons in heavy fighting.
A barrage of artillery fire
from the Honor Guard >s barracks
fired at the main government
fortification struck the

ammunition magazine and brought the fighting
there to
mercifully swift end. 97

a

By 4:00 a.m that morning, Ponce agreed to meet
with the
rebels, but the fighting continued.

The diplomatic corps

soon became involved in brokering a settlement, and
by noon
the fighting stopped. 98

Ponce and his lackeys agreed to

leave the country as long as their families and property

were respected.

In a single

stroke the rebels had brought

down the last vestiges of Liberal rule and had finally
forced Ubico to leave the country.

By October 22, they had

restored order throughout the country and immediately

organized the Revolutionary Junta, made up of Arana, Arbenz
and Toriello as a transitional government until Arevalo

could take office.
In the months following Arevalo' s return from exile

conditions in Guatemala changed decisively.

The civilians

in the Arevalista parties had forged an alliance with young

y
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541.

98

DOS 814.00/10-2344, Affeild to Hull, November 7, 1944 and
DOS 814.00/10-2044, John D. Erwin(U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) to
Hull, October 20, 1944.
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military officers who pledged to
help them gain power. Now,
the coalition had expanded to
included discontented factions
of the military.
Just as the support of the military
ensured the success of populist challenges
to
the old order

in Argentina,

Chile, Brazil and Mexico, the recruitment
of

Guatemala's young officers helped the movement
achieve its
goal of ousting Ponce.

Arevalo also helped the movement realize that goal.
His
appeal broadened the opposition and cemented together
the

various factions at

a

crucial time.

He offered the movement

against Ubico and Ponce the charismatic leader it needed and
in the process transformed it into a movement in support of

Arevalismo.

This shift proved a decisive turning point in

the development of populism in Guatemala as personalism and

charismatic leadership, key elements of populism, emerged
definitively.

From this point forward a broad movement with

effective charismatic leadership would remain

a

central fact

of Guatemalan political life.

D.

Consolidation of the Revolution
(November 1944 - January 1945)

The overthrow of Ponce put an end to the old generals'

dreams of Ubiouismo without Ubico.

In the words of

political scientist Kalman Silvert, the revolt signified "a

thunder clap break with the past."
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During the subsequent

months the Revolutionary Junta
outlined key aspects of a new
constitutional order. Arbenz, Arana,
and Toriello set the
ground rules for change with a flurry
of decrees that they
began issuing less than a week after
they took power.
As the first government of the
Revolution, the Junta
set in motion the machinery of reform.
They achieved a sort
of Revolution by decree between
October of 1944 and March of

Although the constitution embodied the ideals
of the
Revolution, the Junta set the tone for all the
reforms
1945.

that

followed.

Their decrees sent a clear signal that there

would be thorough reforms to restructure the nation's

political life, but that economic reform would come later,
perhaps much later.

They tackled many problems during this

period and did everything from confiscate Ubico's property
to outline who could vote.

Between the October Revolution

and late November, most of the Junta's decrees addressed the

scheduling of elections and the punishments that should be
meted out to Ubico and his associates. Their first decree

dissolved Ubico's Assembly and called for new elections.
Next they carefully removed Ubico's associates from high

ranking positions and "intervened" his property."
In this early period the Junta sought to assuage the

concerns of the indigenous population with

DOS 814.00/1-444, Long to Hull, January
70

4,

a

series of

1944,

decrees.

Ponce had told the Indians that
the revolutionaries would take their land
and rape their women, so the
Junta decided to move quickly to
demonstrate their good
will. 100 on October 31, they
abolished the notorious forced
labor drafts for road construction,
disbanded the infamous
vagrancy courts, and restricted the power
of finca owners.
With these decrees the Junta changed the
legal relationship

between the Native Americans and the rest of
society.

Concretely this meant that for the first time in
their
memory, the Native Americans would not have to
neglect their

crops to build roads as they had for so many years.

101

The Junta also granted the university community the

autonomy they had sought for so long.

In Decree 12 issued

on November 12, 1944, the University of San Carlos received

the independence from government interference that students

had agitated for since 1920.

The Junta also guaranteed the

University 100,000 guetzales and the proceeds from

a

new

alcohol tax for operating expenses.
On November 28, 1944, the Junta issued Decree 17, its

single most important decree, which declared the fundamental

principles of the Revolution.

This decree defined the

DOS 814.2-1444, Long to State, February 16, 1945.
DOS 814.00/1-4444, Long to Hull, January

4,

1944.

.
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The decree went on to outline the ten
principles of the

revolution
Decentralization of powers of the executive and
effective separation of powers of the State.
I.

II. Abolition of the designates to the Presidency

and substitution of them by a Vice President.

III. Alternation in the Executive Power,
abolishing reelection and recognizing the right of
the people to rebel when reelection is attempted.
IV. New constitution and organization of the army
•

•

•

Democratic organization of the municipalities
by means of popular election of their members.

V.

VI.

Effective autonomy of the Judiciary.

VII. Autonomy for the National University.

VIII. Constitutional recognition of political
parties organized in conformity with the law, and
representation of minorities in the popular
electoral colleges

Obligatory suffrage and secret vote for the
literate man. Obligatory suffrage and public vote
for the illiterate man, limiting its exercise to
municipal elections. Recognition of the
IX.

DOS 814.00/11-3044, Long to State, November 30, 1944
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citizenship of the women prepared
to exercise
X. Effective administrative
probity. 103

it.

The striking feature of this
decree is it breadth and scope.
It establishes by fiat a number
of key provisions normally
dictated by the constitution of a nation.
in a single
decree, the Junta swept away a whole
body of law and

precedent.
Arbenz, Toriello, and Arana also initiated a series
of

minor reforms which indicated the direction they
intended to
take the Revolution.
They increased government pensions
in

an attempt to curb corruption and garner support from the

bureaucracy.

They also vowed to wipe out illiteracy and

increased taxation of the wealthy.

The Junta set the limits

of reform and defined the questions on the Constituent

Assembly's schedule.

Despite undemocratic methods, they

gained widespread respect for revamping the political

structure and setting the agenda for reform.

In November,

1944 the U.S. Ambassador, Boaz Long, commented in an

assessment of the Junta's achievements, that
the attitude now displayed by the Revolutionary
Government tends to convince even the most cynical
that its present motives are as public-spirited as
any manifestation that has appeared in Guatemalan
103

30,

Translated in DOS 814.00/11-3044, Long to State, November

1944.
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As the Junta enacted their reforms,
the student faction
of the Arevalista coalition pressured
them to call elections
for a new Legislative Assembly.
in the light of the

position as the leadership of the civilian opposition,
the
universitarios expected to win most of the seats in the

new

Congress if they capitalized on their popularity.

They also

distrusted the military members of the junta. The
universitarios wanted control of the National Assembly to
check any machinations on the part of the military.

105

The difficulties over the calling of the new

Legislative Assembly in November typified the jockeying

between the civilian opposition and the Junta. The election
of the Assembly was supposed to lead to the appointment of

an interim president to discharge all executive functions

until a new president could be elected.

To extract

concessions from the civilians, Arana and Arbenz refused to
issue an official decree calling the Assembly into order.

DOS 814.00/11-3044, Long to State, November 30, 1944.
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in negotiations that
followed the civilians offered to
all ow

the Junta ruling authority
until the inauguration of the new
president.
They also offered Arana the position
of Minister
of War, effectively giving
him control over the military,
regardless of who took power. On November
28, after much
maneuvering, the Junta called the
Legislative Assembly into
session with Decree 17. The decree also
laid out the

principles of the Revolution and set the
guidelines for the
transition to civilian rule. 106
In the negotiations over the calling of the
Assembly,

the civilians gave the Army a new, more favorable
statute

that redefined the relationship between the military and
the

Government.

They granted the Army substantial autonomy from

the office of the president.

This reorganization was a

direct consequence of concerns over servilismo and

professionalism which had motivated the officers to revolt
in the first place. Arana and Arbenz wanted to create a

professional army which was free to develop without the
interference of civilians.

The reorganization decree read;

A new constitution and organization of the
Army which shall effectively guarantee its
apolitical position and permit it to discharge the
functions for which it was organized, that of
defending liberty, the Constitution, and the
national integrity, and creating within the new
organization effective guarantees for its members,
...

106
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The tension between the Junta
and the civilians dissipated,
and both turned their attention
to more pressing matters.

Within two weeks the Junta called
presidential elections for
December 17-19, and one week later the
Assembly set the

Constituent Assembly elections for December
28-30.

Arevalo won handily as the candidate of the
United
Front of Arevalist Political Parties

Partidos Politicos Areval i sta

,

(

Frente Unidos a*

or FUPPA)

.

Garnering 85% of

the votes, he won the freest election in the
nation s
1

tortured political history. His defeat of parties led by

Adrian Recinos (Ubico's Ambassador to the U.S.) and Gregorio
Diaz

(Ubico's Ambassador to Ecuador), signalled a definitive

break with the past.

Now Arevalo had to maintain the

momentum which had brought him to power and preserve the
FUPPA' s fragile unity in the difficult transitional period
to follow.

FUPPA 's success, however, depended on the mediating
role of Arbenz, Arana and Toriello. The Junta contributed to
the revolutionary consolidation not only by their steady

stream of reforms but, more importantly, by guaranteeing

107
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free elections.

By doing this they provided a
solid

foundation for the establishment
of a stable government
capable of carrying out the
reforms the nation so
desperately needed.

With the FUPPA's electoral victory in
late 1944 and
early 1945, Guatemala's populist
revolutionaries had
consolidated and legitimized their claim to
national
leadership.

After Ponce's fall the Arevalista parties

mobilized massive popular support into
change.

Never had

resounding victory.
in

a

strong mandate tor

a

single party legally obtained such a

Never again would Guatemalan society be

such agreement. This period marked the zenith of the

revolutionary coalition'
past,

unity.

They had repudiated the

now they faced the divisive task of constructing the

future.

The Constitution
(January - M.irdi I'M'.)
E.

When the process of drafting the Constitution began
early January,

in

1945 the initiative shiftad Crom the three

man Junta to the Constituent Assembly.

The now constitution

codified the spirit of the Junta':; relorms and became the
revolutionaries' blueprint for

expressed

in

a

new Guatemala.

the new Constitution reveal

77

The

ideals

the populist nature

of the Revolution and
the transforming vision of
the

coalition which ruled the
country for the next decade.
Also the drafting of the
constitution revealed the
tensions within the revolutionary
coalition and the limits
to reform.
The members of the drafting
bodies revealed
biases and prejudices which had
remained latent until this
point.

The most obvious of these revealed
themselves in the
discussions about who could become a
citizen, and by
extension who deserved a voice in the
nation's political
life.
By focussing on the debates about suffrage
and

citizenship

I

will reveal some the biases which limited the

extent of political reform.

Although the legislators addressed

a

wide range of

issues, the single most important debate focused on
how

Guatemala's political system should be democratized.
This debate became the center of attention because many of
the revolutionaries realized that no socio-economic change

could occur without a complete revamping of the political
system.

Therefore, the revolutionaries put political reform

at the top of their agenda. The inclusion of new groups of

voters proved to be the key issue defining this debate.

polemics on the expansion of political participation

78

The

.

illustrates

two important points.

108

First, the Legislative

Assembly expanded political
participation just as other
populist regimes had throughout
Latin America. Secondly,
they did so cautiously with
the goal of consolidating their
political project.
The 140 men elected to the Legislative
Assembly
represented all factions of the coalition
that had brought
down Ubico. They ranged from conservative
businessmen
to

radical unionists, but they shared some basic
attributes.
As a general rule, they were young (with an
average age of
35)

;

the vast majority had direct or indirect ties to the

University, and many deputies represented the FPL and RN

political parties.
On December 28

-

30,

1944 the nation went to the polls

again and selected the members of the new Constituent
Assembly. The 57 men elected had one task, to craft a new

constitution.

In keeping with Guatemalan parliamentary

tradition, the Constituent Assembly then elected fifteen of
its members, called La Comision de los Quince (The

Commission of Fifteen)

,

to draft the new organic law.

This

group, more than any other, defined the nuts and bolts of

Guatemala's post-Ubico political order.

108

The Junta had set

The debates have been compiled in Diario de sesiones de la
asemblea constituente de 1945 (Guatemala 1951)
,
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the tone of reform, but
the Commission defined the
principles and legal mechanisms
which carried it to
fruition.
They produced a draft which
formed the basis for
all subsequent discussions
of the constitution and set the

parameters for debate.
The composition of the Commission
reflected the
structure of the larger Legislative
Assembly, and by

extension the revolutionary coalition.

The president of the

Assembly, Jorge Garcia Granados, chaired
the Commission.
Six liberals, six centrists, and two Social
Democrats formed
the rest of the committee.

109

Lawyers and law students, held

fourteen of the fifteen seats, giving the Law Faculty at
the

University disproportional representation.

110

The Comision drew on two main sources for inspiration
as it worked to formulate an initial draft.

Guatemala's

previous constitutions comprised the most important
influence on the commission's draft.

Many aspects of the

1879 Constitution remained intact in the 1945 document.

The new constitution had a structure very similar to its

The fifteen members of the Commission were: Jorge Garcia
Granados, Francisco Villagran, Adolf o Almengor, Bernardo Alvarado
Tello, Clemente Marroquin Rojas, David Vela, Jorge Adan Serrano,
Jose Falla Aris, Jose Luis Bocaletti, Julio Antonio Reyes
Cardona, Julio Bianchi, L. Alberto Paz y Paz, Manuel de Leon
Cardona, Carlo Garcia Bauer, and Jose Rolz Bennett.
110
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predecessors and the language
echoed terms employed in the
nineteenth century. An influential
document called the

^^^^

drafted by students and

faculty in the Law School served
as the second important
influence on the commission's work.
Many initial
discussions of the group focused
exclusively on the

suggestions included in this document.

111

in fact, the

Anteproyecto contained suffrage restrictions
very similar to
those eventually adopted by the Assembly.
Three key members
of the Comision participated in the
formulation of the

Anteproyecto

,

and they proved forceful advocates for the

suggestions included in it.
The overall tenor of the constitution, however, was
new. The drafting committee included guarantees which had

never before been made to the Guatemalan people.

Article

captures the new tone by stating;

Guatemala is a free, sovereign and independent
republic, organized toward the primary end of
assuring its inhabitants the enjoyment of liberty,
culture, economic welfare and social justice Its
system of government is democratic-representative"
(emphasis added). 112
.

111

The entire Anteproyecto can be seen in published form in
Anteproyecto a la Constitucion de Guatemala (Guatemala, 1947).
,
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Ensuring social justice and
economic welfare became the
State's responsibility for
the first time in the nation's
history. with the constitutional
reforms the members of the
Constituent Assembly forged a new
conception of the state
and its responsibilities to the
citizenry.

The Assembly also broke ground in
guaranteeing new
rights for workers. They outlined the
basic elements of
what would become Guatemala's first labor
code in 1947.
in
a series of nineteen new articles
the Assembly set a minimum
wage, outlawed payment in kind, granted the
right to free

organization, mandated paid vacation, regulated female and

child labor, and set an eight hour day.

Article 66 even

recognized unions and cooperatives as the basis for "social
compatibility."

This provision reflected the corporatist

tendency of Latin American populism, where governments used
unions and similar organizations to mobilize and control the
people.

113

Moving beyond simply guaranteeing worker's rights,

Article

2

established the right to rebel if the government

violated the constitutional order.

This provision developed

from the Revolutionary Junta's decree that the people could

113

For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon in Brazil
see Kenneth Paul Erikson's article, "Brazil Corporative
Authoritarianism, Democratization, and Dependency" in Howard J.
Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, Latin American Politics and
Development (Boulder, 1979)
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resist if the Executive
attempted to remain in power beyond
the single term allowed by
law.

The constitution also introduced
precedent-setting
ideas for the nation about
private property. While
recognizing the right to individual
property, the document
declared that all property had a social
function
(Article

The law went further to say that the
State could
expropriate land with prior compensation if the
owner did
not fully utilize it (Article 92).
90)

.

In another break with tradition, the constitutional

framers outlawed latifundia. striking at the heart
of the

oligarchic system they so despised.

The law stated that

existing large landholding could only be extended once "they
may be organized for the benefit of society." 114

This vague

provision demonstrates that the revolutionaries wanted a
legal basis to attack the nation's archaic agricultural
system.

The new constitution went further to outline the

State's duty to demonstrate a preference for the laboring

masses in Article 88, which reads
The State shall orient the national economy for
the benefit of the people, toward the end of
assuring each individual an existence which is
dignified and of benefit to society. It is the
primary function of the State to develop
114
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State intervention to ensure social
justice formed the basis
of the new economic ideology
which the revolutionaries

sought to impose on the nation.

The committee's ideas

mirrored the efforts of Vargas, Peron, and
Cardenas.
The assembly also nationalized all sub-soil rights,

effectively nationalizing oil exploration and exploitation
(Article 89). This law explicitly echoed the Mexican

Constitution of 1917 which the populist President Lazaro
Cardenas employed in 1938 to nationalize American and
British oil companies.

The constitution did not only address economic issues,
however.
issues.

Many provision dealt with social and cultural
In fact, Article 79 established the "development and

dissemination of culture, in all its manifestations" as a
primary obligation of the State.

The entire seventh section

of the constitution addressed cultural issues.

Again, this

provision reflected the efforts of other populist regimes.
Much as Mexico encouraged "national" art, and the APRA

movement of Peru drew on Indian "nationalism," Guatemala's

115
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revolutionaries sought to define
their national culture in a
positive way.

Although cultural and economic issues
often preoccupied
the revolutionaries, the
transformation of the
political

system remained the most important
project of the
Constituent Assembly. without changes in
the political
system, they had no way of safeguarding
the socio-economic
system they hoped to create. The desire to
protect the
advances embodied in the rest of the constitution
focused
the Assembly's energy on the creation of a new
political

order based on expanded political participation.

Article
rights,

9,

which outlined citizenship and voting

formed the centerpiece of the Constituent Assembly's

political reforms.

While the members took great care to

outline the responsibilities of the Executive, Legislative
and Judicial branches, they realized that electoral power

would determine their ability to deliver the promised
reforms.

That realization created tensions within the

Assembly over the speed and extent of democratic
liberalization.

Thus expansion of suffrage became the locus

of controversy throughout most of the spring of 194 5.

The real debate revolved around the granting of

suffrage to illiterates and women, the two groups explicitly

excluded by previous constitutions.

85

The potentially

unpredictable nature of these
groups- political allegiances
made many of the revolutionaries
wary of granting them
political power through the
vote.
The final, somewhat
convoluted, wording which the
Commission settled on
reflected their uneasiness about
introducing democracy too
quickly.
Article 9, states:
Citizens are:
1. Males over eighteen years of
age;
2. Guatemalan women over eighteen
years
who know how to read and write; Rights of aqe
and
inherent in citizenship are; to elect, be duties
elected,
and take public office. Suffrage is
obligatory and
secret for those able to read and write;
optional
and secret for female citizens, optional and
public for illiterate citizens. All males of
eighteen years who know how to read and write are
obliged to register with the Civic Registry
within the year they obtain citizenship. For
women and illiterates, such registration is a
right.
Illiterates may exercise suffrage six
months after having registered.
...No one may
force a female citizen or an illiterate to
register in the Civic Registry or to vote. Nor
may any citizen be compelled to vote for a given
person.

The reason the Assembly chose this definition is clear.

The

total exclusion of illiterate women and restricted suffrage
for illiterate men and literate women created an electoral

bloc large enough to provide them with victory at the ballot
box.

116

Without losing control of the political system, they

Ibid., 208
86

ensured themselves electoral
success.
This somewhat
bizarre, multi-level voting
system grew directly out of the
revolutionaries' attempt to bring
about a transformation
from above.
They had made tenuous progress
which
only

cautious political maneuvering could
safeguard.

There did not exist any kind of populist
model either
that they could look to in trying to
solve the problem of
expanding the electorate. Argentina, Mexico,
Brazil, all

had granted differing amounts of political
participation to
illiterates and women. The disagreement among populist

nations over the right of citizenship demonstrates the

difficulties inherent in such

a project.

The extent of the revolutionaries' caution is

illustrated by the fact that not even

a

single member of the

committee advocated universal suffrage. All of the members
favored some sort of restrictions on illiterates' and

women's votes.

They shared a fear that somehow "unprepared"

groups could undermine the new political order.
24,

On January

1945 the Commission began its deliberations on the

extension of suffrage to women.

Speaking in the first

minutes of debate, Alberto Paz y Paz, the representative
from Zacapa, expressed the general sentiment in favor of

restriction.

He said

think that women should not be excluded from
and I believe that the
political rights
I

.

.

.
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The members of the Commission
argued endlessly over the
capacity of women to participate
in the political system.
After much debate, however, the
fifteen members agreed to
table discussion of women's role
until they had decided the
fate of illiterates which they
thought might be easier to
resolve.

The discussion of whether to extend the vote
to those
who could not read or write dragged on for
several

sessions.

The fear that the "illiterate masses" would be used
by some

demagogue to revive Liberal tyranny remained the touchstone
of debate.

However, precisely this fear of demagoguery

provided the impetus for granting illiterates the vote.
Clemente Marroguin Rojas, a long time opposition figure from
El Progreso in the Oriente region,

gave the most succinct

explanation of the Commission's thinking.

He stated that if

illiterates were not granted the vote, "the Liberal Party
will triple its size inside of two months and with perfect

right."

Alberto Paz y Paz echoed this sentiment when he

rose to warn of the consequences of denying the vote to

illiterates. He said
117
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The Commission soon realized
that to deny illiterates
the vote was to negate the
democratic aspirations of the

Revolution and, perhaps more importantly,
to risk alienating
a very volatile political
force.
David Vela, the editor of
El Imparcial
highlighted this contradiction for
the

,

Commission when he proposed the formation of
to consider the topic.

a

sub-committee

He said that extension of the vote

to the majority of Guatemalans (roughly 70 percent of
the

population couldn't read or write) was the key "to the
democratic organization that you are going to give to the
country.

1,120

Eventually, Jorge Garcia Granados overcame the impasse

with his deft political arguments.

He pointed out that the

responsibility for the previous dictatorships did not lie
with the illiterate population.

Ubico's rule

was the handiwork of the capital City, the
handiwork of General Manuel Orellena, backed up by
his cannons, by the U.S. Ambassador, and a group
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of Deputies that were the
real civic
illiterates.
1

Finally, on January 30,

1945,

the Commission accepted

wording which extended the vote to
illiterate men with the
condition that they vote publically.
Literate men had the
right to vote secretly, but the legislators
wanted the new
voters to cast their ballots in the open under
the watchful
eyes of electoral officials.
That same day they accepted the wording which empowered
literate women to vote but disenfranchised illiterate women.
The Commission spent many days thrashing out the details of
the proposal.

The fact that they granted literate women the

vote and excluded illiterate women reveals the persistence
of class antagonisms within the populist coalition

represented by the Assembly.
In the discussions of women's suffrage, the issue

quickly became not whether women should get the vote, but

which women and under what circumstances.

As the debate on

citizenship for women proceeded, it became clear that the
revolutionaries were very uncomfortable with the idea of
giving the illiterate, Indian female population the vote.
The Commission thought that these women were more

susceptible to outside influences, that they would respond

121

Ibid.,

91
90

.

,

to the agitation of the
Catholic Church and reactionary
forces.
This fear was, in part, based on
their knowledge of
the role women played in the 1933
elections in Spain. Rural

Spanish women, mobilized by the church, hurt
the Republican
parties badly. 122 These women had only been
granted the vote
in 1931,

so the lessons appeared clear.

women could prove
church.

a

Newly enfranchised

powerful force when organized by the

Garcia Granados lived in Spain during the Republic

and had close ties to the Republican government. He and

other members of the Commission who had fought for the

Spanish government against fascism had powerful memories of
women mobilized by the forces of conservatism.
Similarly, many of the members of the Commission,

including such influential figures as Garcia Granados,
Villagran, and Bianchi, had been exiled to Mexico during the

previous decades where rural women participated in
of conservative movements led by the church.

123

a

number

The Cristero

revolt of the 1920s, which attacked the government of

Plutarco Calles, had been supported by many poor, rural

women who had close ties to the church.

A more recent

W.M. Morton, Woman Suffrage in Mexico (Gainesville,

1962)

23

For a discussion of attitudes towards woman suffrage in
Mexico see William Blough, "Political Attitudes of Mexican Women:
Support for the Political System Among a Newly-enfranchised
Group", Journal of Interamerican Studies 14:2 (1972), 202-203.
123

.
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example, which many members
of the Commission may have seen
first-hand, took place during the
1939 elections.
in that
year, the Mexican Congress
discussed extending the vote to
women.
However, during the campaigning for the
1940

elections large numbers of women participated
in

a

conservative, church-backed challenge to the
ruling Partido

^nxt^+^^^^

Revolucionario

124

The Congress dec ided to

postpone granting Mexican women the vote as

a result of this

challenge.
So this abiding fear of rural women's political role
was based on the experiences of the Commission members.

What is even more interesting is that the Commission almost
seems to be saying that "our women"

(read urban,

literate,

middle to upper class) can be trusted, while women we cannot
influence are

a

danger to the revolutionary project.

This

attitude reveals the limits of the revolutionaries

democratic ideology and highlights the importance of socioracial and class identification within the revolutionary

coalition.

The debate about granting women the vote followed much
the same route as the debates about the political

reliability of illiterates.

Discussion once more focused on

who had been to blame for the tyranny of the previous

Morton, Woman Suffrage in Mexico
92

,

39-41.

decades. As with the illiterate
male population, the
Assembly members feared the rural
masses generally because
of the perception that Ubico
's rule had depended on them.

Clemente Marroquin Rojas challenged this
assumption when he
bluntly stated:
In respect to the fears of Representative Vela
and
of Representative Rolz about the influence
of the
priests over women, effectively there is no such
decisive influence. You have observed that all
women had a primordial role in the last marches,
while the majority of men were in hiding.
I have
never seen a woman collecting signatures for the
reelection of Ubico, but I have seen men
collecting signatures. 125
He reminded the Commission that it was men like themselves,

mostly urban and educated, who supported Ubico for so many
years, not women.

Garcia Granados made
the end of the debate.

a

very revealing comment toward

The Commission was arguing over

whether or not the vote should be optional or obligatory for
women.

Garcia Granados outlined the basis for their final

decision to make the vote optional. He stated:

Women ought to vote optionally. The majority of
women are not interested, and when obliged to vote
they will ask advice of certain people. They are

125

Comision de los Quince, Diario de sesiones
93

,

80.

not going to vote according to
their own
criteria.
Again, the revolutionaries expressed
their fear that women
cannot make political decisions for themselves.
Outside

influence and the haunting specter of reaction,
dogged the
revolutionaries as they tried to forge a new Guatemala.

Many of the deputies felt that educational restrictions
could insulate the electoral system from outside influence.

They proposed making reading and writing the basis for

proving a woman's capacity to be a good citizen.

This

requirement effectively reduced the number of women who
could vote to around 22,000.
there were approximately
Guatemala.
write.

3

According to the 1940 census

60,000 literate women in all of

Of this number only 22,206 could both read and

127

This statistic reveals that, with

a

stroke of the pen,

the drafting commission disenfranchised 340,000 women for

decades to come by simply adding the requirement that they
be able to read and write.

Out of a total female population

of roughly 1.6 million, about 800,000 had already been

excluded by the provision which conditioned voting on the

126

Ibid.,

176.

Asamblea Constituyente, Diario de sesiones de
Constituvente (Guatemala, 1947), 131.
127

94

la

Asamblea

ability to read, of the remaining
360,000 women who could
read, only a tiny fraction
could both read and write. The
Commission deemed only a minute
portion of the female

population capable of executing the
complicated task of
voting (and, of course supporting
them at election time). 128
In contrast to their view of rural
women, the

Commission felt a responsibility to recognize
the competence
of "their" women,
the women of Guatemala City, who
had

acted so decisively in the struggle against Ubico.

Representative Rolz Bennett made his admiration for these
urban educated women explicit when he declared, "I remember
the march of June 25th, in which women were more civic

minded in many cases than we." 129

This sentiment was echoed

by Francisco Villagran

acknowledge the external influences that weigh
on the spirit of women. We witnessed the brilliant
actions
of our wives, our daughters during the
march in the last week of June that brought as its
consequence the decision of Ubico to renounce his
power. 130
I

The Commission trusted middle class women, so their only

task was to decide what other women had the capacity to

128

Ibid.

129

Comision de los Quince, Diario de sesiones

130

Ibid., 85.
95

,

84

exercise the sacred duty of voting.

Who had shown the

necessary civic spirit?

Women had proven their civic spirit in many
ways during
the preceding months through marches,
organizing,
forming

auxiliaries to the political parties and many other
ways.
Women took part in the fighting that drove Ponce

from power.

To ensure that the Assembly did not forget their
role in the

Revolution, a group of middle class women formed the Pro-

Citizenship Feminine Union of Guatemala

Guatemalteca Pro ciudadania

^

,

Assembly during the debates.

(

Union Femenina

which directly addressed the
They sent a letter to the

Constituent Assembly that Representative Manuel Fortuny read
on February 6th,

1945.

These women felt they had already

demonstrated their capacity to vote, and so they
respectfully demanded that suffrage be extended to them. The
letter reads,

The directorate of the Pro-Citizenship Feminine
Union of Guatemala that gathers in its bosom by
the thousands women of the entire Republic,
belonging to diverse social sectors and of all
political and religious creeds courteously address
you so that through your generosity may be carried
to this Constituent Assembly the voice of
Guatemalan women who reclaim for themselves the
recognition of their political rights. The
representatives know the decisive and overwhelming
attitude that Guatemalan women had in the days
before the October Revolution, and during the
revolution itself, and because of that personal
knowledge you are in a position to weigh the high
civicism that embodied women's attitude, civicism
96

ut .t°. the test the capacity of
IxtrniZ
exercise their rights of citizenship women to
and
complementary obligations which it brings.the
... you
can deceive yourself and perpetuate
the injustice
of the Organic Law drawn up in
1935, to declare
expressly that citizenship is only a masculine
privilege.
Signed,
Garciela Quan Valenzuela (President)
Elisa Hall Asturias (Vice President)
Angelina Acuha de Castaneda (Secretary)

131

A similar letter, by Doha Rosa de Mora,
challenged the

members to fulfill the promise of the Revolution, and

pointed out the dilemma they faced. She wrote,
Knowing your spirit of justice I hope that you
will not place conscientious women in a condition
inferior to that of the illiterate population.
May God enlighten you for the good of the
country.

Testament to the fact that middle class women could not
be excluded from the political system is captured in an

exchange between two deputies on the final day of debate
about granting women suffrage. Jose Manuel Fortuny, who

would later be important in the Guatemalan Worker's Party,

proposed the exclusion of all women from voting "to defend
He cited the

the authentic principles of the revolution."

fact that even Mexico had not granted women the vote after

131

132

Asemblea Constituyente
Ibid.

,

Diario de Sesiones

,

151

|

30 years as a revolutionary nation.

in response Carlos

Garcia Bauer, one of the original
fifteen members of the
drafting committee gave a stirring speech.
After Fortuny's
proposal, Garcia Bauer asked

Why have you forgotten so soon the heroic gesture
of Guatemalan women? The 2 5th of June women
brilliantly
saved the Guatemalan Revolution.
Guatemalan women sustained their efforts in the
days of Ponce, they fought politically, founded
clubs, braving all manner of danger, and
Guatemalan women in the uniform of Army nurses on
October 2 0th ran among the bullets. What are you
thinking then? 133
He chronicled the contributions women had made to the life
of the nation in a long speech which was punctuated with

applause throughout. Finally, he concluded "Well then, give
them the vote."

That day, February 6th, 194 5, the Assembly

included wording which granted literate women the vote.
This dramatic climax to the debates reveals that the

revolutionaries recognized the political role of middle
class women.

These women's participation in the Revolution

and their position as members of the newly ascendent middle

class gained them the right to a public political role.

politicians viewed them as allies in the consolidation of
the Revolution.

133

Ibid.,

164
98

The

Another, interesting point here
is that the Assembly
granted the vote to illiterate men
because of their fear of

alienating the majority of the population
as seen in the
debate above.
But, they granted literate women the
vote, as
we shall see, because they had proven
their "civic spirit"
(i.e.

that they were politically reliable.

And Illiterate

women were excluded entirely, presumably because
they had
not proven their reliability and because they were
not
powerful enough to be actively feared.

The complex, multi-

tiered political system which the legislator created

reflected biases, personal experiences, and political
realities, but at the same time it reflects the cautious and

pragmatic nature of the revolutionary coalition. They sought
to guarantee the success of their political project, and the

exclusion of illiterate women from the rights of citizenship
was not a large price to pay, for the revolutionaries.

The tragedy of this period is that the Constituent

Assembly even while recognizing the contribution of some
women excluded the majority of women from the public
political sphere for years to come, and in doing so they

confirmed the class and ethnic biases of the Revolution.
The rural masses had not participated in the Revolution to

99

any real degree and as a
result their marginalization in the
political and economic life of the
nation continued. 134

The direction of change remained
somewhat unclear in
the Spring of 1945, but the
revolutionaries had made the
fateful decision to perpetuate a system
based on ethnic and
class divisions.
In doing so they decided that politics
would still be dictated from the capital without
the

participation of Guatemala's majority.

Politics would

remain the stuff of the urban, educated population, and in
that respect not much had changed.

What had changed is that

new groups had forced their way into political power to

shape Guatemala to their needs.

In his book Populism in Peru Steve Stein stresses that a
key element of populism is an effort to mobilize and control the
masses.
It is unclear to what extent the revolutionaries
intended to construct the constitutional system as a means of
direct social control, but the end result proved to be the same.
,

CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSION

The inauguration of Juan Jose Arevalo on
March 15th,
1945 signalled the definitive triumph of
Guatemala's

populist revolutionaries.

They had succeeded in their goal

of establishing a political system that
could facilitate the

restructuring of the nation's socio-economic order,

with

the new constitution and Arevalo as president, they now

turned their attention to economic and social reform. They
faced the challenge of translating the vague promises of

Arevalismo into practice.
When the president elect took office, however, one
thing remained clear:

the direction and content of the

reforms to come had already been determined by the nation's
new law of the land.

The laws which followed simply

extended and elaborated the provisions of the 194 5
constitution.

The president and congress enacted laws which

established a national health care system, founded the

Guatemalan Social Security Institute, created a worker's

compensation system, funded rural education programs, and

101

encouraged unionization.

m

short, they transformed the

nation's socio-economic system
by decree. 135

What then is the legacy of the
initial twelve months of
the Revolution? First and foremost,
the nation now had a
blueprint for change and a group of
politicians determined
to revolutionize the socio-economic
system.
There existed
for the first time both the political
will and the
legal

mechanisms for social change. This fact not only
altered the
political system, it generated new attitudes. For so
many of
the country's inhabitants, the realization that
the nation's

corrupt, dictatorial past had truly been repudiated created
a

sense of hope and optimism for the future.
Second, Guatemala's middle class had forced their way

into power. Never again would the old oligarchy rule with

such absolute control as it had prior to the overthrow of
Ubico.

The military also came into its own as an

independent political actor in the uprisings of 1944.

They

had become the arbiters of Guatemalan politics with an

agenda all their own, and no government could hope to remain
in power without their support.

135

An excellent work which reviews the reforms of the Arevalo
administration is Leo Suslow's, Aspects of the Social Reform in
Guatemala. 1944 -1949: Problems of Planned Social Change in an
Underdeveloped Country (Hamilton, N.Y., 1949). For a more
concise summary of the basic elements of the reforms see Jim
Handy, Gift of the Devil 106-113.
,
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Third, the nation's political system
had been radically
altered by the expansion of suffrage to
new groups. Jacobo

Arbenz's landslide victory in 1950 attests
to the
revolutionaries' success in creating electoral support
for
themselves.
Out of an official total of 417,000
votes,

Arbenz carried 263,234, with his closest challenger
winning
only 74

,

3

41.

136

Arbenz's overwhelming victory as a candidate

for reform depended heavily on the votes of illiterates

enfranchised by the 1945 constitution.
The 1950 elections marked the advent of modern mass

politics in Guatemala.

From 1944 forward political parties

extended their reach further and further into the remote

highlands in an attempt to garner support.

Campaigns drew

more and more people into the political life of the
nation.

137

Although the military dictatorship established

after 1954 resorted to electoral fraud and intimidation,
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Marta Cehelsky, ed.
(Washington, 1966), 31.
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Guatemalan Election Factbook
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For an interesting commentary on the impact of the
Revolution on the political life of the rural majority see Robert
Wasserstrom, "Revolution in Guatemala: Peasant and Politics under
the Arbenz Government," Comparative Studies in Society and
443-470
History 17:4 (October 1975)
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broad sectors of society now had
the sense that they had a
right to a political voice. 138
Fourth, the nation had witnessed the
emergence of a
dynamic movement for reform which was populist
in every

sense of the word.

The Revolution shared the attributes of

being "urban, multi-class, electoral, expansive,
"popular-,
and led by a charismatic leader" with other
populist

experiments of this period. 139

Guatemala's variant,

Arevalismo, grew out of the combination of economic
discontent, growing nationalism, and desire for political

liberalization.

Just as groups in other countries sought a

"third way" to achieve social and economic development, so
too did the leaders of the uprising against Ubico.

The tragedy of Guatemala's populist movement to

modernize is that it suffered

a

unique demise.

Argentine Peronism, Brazil's Getulismo

.

Unlike

Peru's Aprismo

.

and

other movements which collapsed mostly due to internal
problems, Guatemala's Revolution was attacked from without.
It too suffered from internal tensions and disunity, but

For commentary on the growth of political expectations see
John W. Sloan's "Electoral Frauds and Social Change: The
Guatemalan Example," Science and Society 34:1 (Spring, 1970),
78-91.
,

Michael Conniff, "Towards a Comparative Definition of
Latin American P opulism in
Populism," in Michael Conniff, ed.
Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982), 13.
139

,

,
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U.S.

intervention proved the decisive
factor in bringing
the reforms of 1944 to an
abrupt end
in 1954.

In 1952, Jacobo Arbenz, the
second president of the

Revolution finally attacked the nation's
archaic
agricultural system with a thorough land
reform.

The law,

known as Decree 900, set up a massive
national land reform
which redistributed unused land from the
largest landholders
in an attempt to make more efficient use
of the land.

140

Within two years over 900,00 acres of land had been
turned
over to cooperatives and individuals.

Fully 500,000

individuals out of a total population of
access to land as result of the reform.

141

3

million gained
Finally, the

rural masses began to see the concrete benefits of the

Revolution.
Arbenz' s reform shook the nation's oligarchy to its

core and began to break the centuries-old hold they had over
the economy.

Arbenz also attacked the United Fruit Company,

expropriating 200,000 acres which the government immediately

140

For the literature on the Agrarian Reform see Jose Luis
Paredes Moriera, Reforma aqraria: un experiencia quatemalteca
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distributed to 23,000 peasants.

1

*2

The president realized

that in order to change Guatemala
from what he called "a
dependent nation with a semi-colonial
economy" into an

independent nation he had to break both the
elite and
UFCO.

143

The challenge to UFCO, however, proved to
be fatal for
the Revolution. The U.S. government could not
sit idly by
and watch as an important American company had
land taken
from it.

The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and

his brother Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, began to

plot the demise of Arbenz for so impetuously challenging

American economic interests. 144

The Dulles brothers had

served UFCO faithfully for years as negotiators for the

company's contracts with Jorge Ubico in 1931 and 1936. 145
Now they had a chance to serve again.

142
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115.
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The best account of this episode can be found in Richard
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The CIA armed and funded a
polyglot group of exiled
Guatemalan army officers and mercenaries
to overthrow
Arbenz.
The agency even went so far as to supply
planes,
bombs and American pilots to the
counterrevolution. Against
the U.S., Arbenz and the Revolution
did not stand a chance.

Internal tensions assisted the Dulles brothers in
their
plans.
After 10 heady years of progress, the Revolution

collapsed when attacked.

Weighed down by the burden of

rapidly delivering economic and social change and balancing
the interests of so many different sectors, the populist

coalition broke into fragments.

Various groups which had

been bound together by nebulous common goals began

quarrelling as the reforms began to reallocate power and
resources.

Many of the early supporters of the Revolution

turned to oppose it as the government began to carry the
reforms further and further.

When the CIA-backed counterrevolutionaries began
bombing Guatemala City and invaded the country, Arbenz faced
the agonizing choice of capitulating because the Army would
not support him or arming the workers and students and

risking all out civil war. He capitulated. U6

U6

It is interesting to note that Arbenz confronted the same
dilemma that Peron and Vargas faced when challenged by military
opposition. All three gave up the reigns of power rather than
plunge their nations into armed civil strife.
107

Colonel Castillo Armas, the Americans'
hand-picked
leader of the coup, immediately
began undoing the work of
the Revolution.

He annulled the Constitution of 1945
and

began persecuting the political
parties, unions and peasant
groups which formed the backbone of
Arbenz's support.

Castillo Armas' supporters killed hundreds of
peasants
accused of being "communists." 147

Almost overnight,

Guatemala regressed to the days of Ubico.
In the decades since Guatemala's "liberation" by the
U.S. backed coup the nation has experienced a frightful

epidemic of violence.

Poverty continues to hold the

majority of the population in its grasp.

The praetorian

military dictatorships which have held the reins of power
since 1954 identify all who challenge them as "communist."

Labor unions struggle to survive in a nation where

organizing means risking disappearance and torture.

The

country which held so much promise between 1944 and 1954 now
bears the epitaph, "the land of eternal tyranny."

Arevalo's inaugural address reverberates across the
decades in haunting condemnation of contemporary Guatemalan

governments and their failure to address the needs of the
majority.

Even though he spoke of the days of Ubico and

u7

John Gillin and Kalman Silvert, "Ambiguities in
Guatemala", Foreign Affairs 34 (April, 1956), 470.
,

108

Cabrera, he could just as easily
have been referring to the

military dictatorships of the
1970s and 1980s when he said:
ha
en the c °nviction - and I continue
to have
nation cannot be free while any one of
"^Jta
t;
2 bitants are unfree, and that the
dignity
of \t
the Republic is made of synthesis of the
dignity that dwells, living and protected,
in each
of those that live off the earth. To
attain this
we must confront the peculiar social and
economic
structure of the country: of a country where the
culture, politics and economy are in the hands
of
three hundred families heirs of colonial
privileges or sell outs in foreign factories or
members of an official administrative sect which
protect those interests and expand geometrically
their own. ... There must begin in Guatemala from
various directions at once and promoted with
integrity a liberating movement for the majority
which lawfully restores the rights of citizenship
wrongfully stolen and which promotes the stammered
economic demands of the proletariat, the workers
and the peasants.
In this Guatemala, ravaged by
foreigners and Guatemalans, the agents that suck
dry the nation's riches and maintain culture on an
aristocratic level must be confronted. 148

^

^

.

Juan Jose Arevalo, Escritos Politicos v Discursos (Havana,
1953), 495-496.
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